politscienceПолитическая наукаPolitical science1998-1775ИНИОН РАН10.31249/poln/2024.02.09politscience-1081Research ArticleРАКУРСЫВлияние характеристик лидеров на межгосударственные конфликты: диадический анализThe effects of leader characteristics on interstate conflicts: a dyadic analysisСедашовЕ. А.SedashovE. A.

Седашов Евгений Александрович, PhD, доцент Департамента политики и управления Факультета социальных наук

Москва

Sedashov Evgeny

Moscow

esedashov@hse.ruЧерновД. Н.ChernovD. N.

Чернов Даниил Николаевич, аспирант, Департамент политики и управления Факультета социальных наук

Москва

Chernov Daniil

Moscow

dnchernov@hse.ruБаланинаС. Н.BalaninaS. N.

Баланина Софья Николаевна, студентка бакалавриата, программа «Вычислительные социальные науки»

Москва

Balanina Sofya

Moscow

snbalanina_1@edu.hse.ruНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияHSE UniversityRussian Federation20242705202402Меняющиеся мировые порядки193217Copyright © Седашов Е.А., Чернов Д.Н., Баланина С.Н., 20242024Седашов Е.А., Чернов Д.Н., Баланина С.Н.Sedashov E.A., Chernov D.N., Balanina S.N.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/1081

Современный анализ межгосударственных вооружённых конфликтов, как правило, концентрируется на эффектах структурных характеристик, таких, как военная и экономическая мощь, политическая система и географическое положение. Вместе с тем индивидуальная роль ключевых лиц, принимающих решения, часто оказывается вне поле зрения исследователей. В данной статье мы анализируем влияние характеристик лидеров на межгосударственные вооруженные конфликты. В центре нашего внимания находятся два параметра: асимметрия сроков правления и способ получения власти. В фокусе нашей теории лежат проблемы неполной информации и достоверных обязательств. Мы ожидаем, что лидеры с асимметричными сроками правления с меньшей вероятностью вовлекаются в вооруженные конфликты, чем лидеры с симметричными сроками правления. Данный результат в некотором смысле противоречит стандартной модели, согласно которой большее количество знаний лидеров друг о друге должно вести к меньшей вероятности конфликта. Также мы предполагаем, что лидеры, получившие власть конвенциональным способом, с меньшей вероятностью вовлекаются в межгосударственные вооруженные конфликты, потому что таким лидерам гораздо проще брать на себя достоверные обязательства по поддержанию мира. К конвенциональным способам получения власти мы относим выборы, наследственную передачу или любой другой способ, определяющийся в конкретной стране как законный. Неконвенциональные способы включают в себя революции и перевороты. Для эмпирической проверки данных гипотез мы используем массив диадических данных и логит-регрессию. Результаты основных моделей и проверок на устойчивость в целом согласуются с представленной теорией.

Modern researchers of militarized interstate disputes pay significant attention to the effects of structural characteristics, such as raw military and economic power, political system and geographical position. At the same time, the role of key decision-makers in outbreak of militarized interstate disputes receives scant scholar attention. This paper relates two pivotal characteristics of leaders, type of entry into the office and tenure, with the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes. Our theory focuses on two key problems: incomplete information and credible commitment. The authors theorize that leaders with asymmetric tenures and regular type of entries are less likely to engage in war with each other while leaders with symmetric tenures and irregular type of entries are more likely to start a military conflict with each other. Statistical findings from dyadic logit regression analysis and robustness checks largely confirm theoretical expectations.

межгосударственный вооруженный конфликтмодель конфликтного торгадостоверные обязательстванеполная информацияасимметрия пребывания в должностидиадический анализmilitarized interstate disputecrisis bargainingcredible commitmentincomplete informationasymmetric tenuresdyadic analysisСтатья подготовлена в рамках консорциума МГИМО МИД России и НИУ ВШЭ из средств гранта на реализацию программы стратегического академического лидерства «Приоритет – 2030».The article was prepared within the consortium of MGIMO University and HSE University and funded by the grant for the implementation of the Priority 2030 Strategic Academic Leadership Program.ReferencesBeck N., Katz J., Tucker R. Taking time seriously: time-series cross section analysis with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of Political Science. 1998, Vol. 42, N 4, P. 1260–1288. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2991857Beck N., Katz J., Tucker R. Taking time seriously: time-series cross section analysis with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of Political Science. 1998, Vol. 42, N 4, P. 1260–1288. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2991857Bennett S.D., Stam A.C. The behavioral origins of war. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan press, 2004, 280 p.Bennett S.D., Stam A.C. The behavioral origins of war. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan press, 2004, 280 p.Bueno de Mesquita B., Siverson R.M. War and the survival of political leaders: a comparative study of regime types and political accountability. American political science review. 1995, Vol. 89, N 4, P. 841–855. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2082512Bueno de Mesquita B., Siverson R.M. War and the survival of political leaders: a comparative study of regime types and political accountability. American political science review. 1995, Vol. 89, N 4, P. 841–855. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2082512Bueno de Mesquita B., Morrow J., Siverson R.M., Smith A. An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. American political science review. 1999, Vol. 93, N 4, P. 791–807. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2586113Bueno de Mesquita B., Morrow J., Siverson R.M., Smith A. An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. American political science review. 1999, Vol. 93, N 4, P. 791–807. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2586113Bueno de Mesquita B., Siverson R.M., Woller G. War and the fate of regimes: a comparative analysis. American political science review. 1992, Vol. 86, N 4, P. 638–646. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1964127Bueno de Mesquita B., Siverson R.M., Woller G. War and the fate of regimes: a comparative analysis. American political science review. 1992, Vol. 86, N 4, P. 638–646. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1964127Chiozza G., Goemans H.E. Peace through insecurity: tenure and international conflict. Journal of conflict resolution. 2003, Vol. 47, N 4, P. 443–467. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002703252975Chiozza G., Goemans H.E. Peace through insecurity: tenure and international conflict. Journal of conflict resolution. 2003, Vol. 47, N 4, P. 443–467. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002703252975Chiozza G., Goemans H.E. International conflict and the tenure of leaders: is war still ex post inefficient? American journal of political science. 2004, Vol. 48, N 3, P. 604–619. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1519919Chiozza G., Goemans H.E. International conflict and the tenure of leaders: is war still ex post inefficient? American journal of political science. 2004, Vol. 48, N 3, P. 604–619. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1519919Croco S. The decider’s dilemma: leader culpability, war outcomes, and domestic punishment. American political science review. 2011, Vol. 105, N 3, P. 457–477. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000219Croco S. The decider’s dilemma: leader culpability, war outcomes, and domestic punishment. American political science review. 2011, Vol. 105, N 3, P. 457–477. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000219Dixon W. Democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict. American political science review. 1994, Vol. 88, N 1, P. 14–32. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2944879Dixon W. Democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict. American political science review. 1994, Vol. 88, N 1, P. 14–32. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2944879Dube O., Harish S.P. Queens. Journal of political economy. 2020, Vol. 128, N 7, P. 2579–2652. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/707011Dube O., Harish S.P. Queens. Journal of political economy. 2020, Vol. 128, N 7, P. 2579–2652. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/707011Fearon J.D. Rationalist explanations for war. International organization. 1995, Vol. 49, N 3, P. 379–414. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324Fearon J.D. Rationalist explanations for war. International organization. 1995, Vol. 49, N 3, P. 379–414. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324Fearon J.D. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American political science review. 1994, Vol. 88, N 3, P. 577–592. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2944796Fearon J.D. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American political science review. 1994, Vol. 88, N 3, P. 577–592. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2944796Fordham B. Partisanship, macroeconomic policy, and U.S. uses of force, 1949–1994. Journal of conflict resolution. 1998, Vol. 42, N 4, P. 418–439. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002798042004002Fordham B. Partisanship, macroeconomic policy, and U.S. uses of force, 1949–1994. Journal of conflict resolution. 1998, Vol. 42, N 4, P. 418–439. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002798042004002Geddes, B. What do we know about democratization after twenty years? Annual review of political science. 1999, Vol. 2, P. 115–144. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115Geddes, B. What do we know about democratization after twenty years? Annual review of political science. 1999, Vol. 2, P. 115–144. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115Gelpi C., Grieco J.M. Attracting trouble: democracy, leadership tenure, and the targeting of militarized challenges. Journal of conflict resolution. 2001, Vol. 45, N 6, P. 794–817. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002701045006005Gelpi C., Grieco J.M. Attracting trouble: democracy, leadership tenure, and the targeting of militarized challenges. Journal of conflict resolution. 2001, Vol. 45, N 6, P. 794–817. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002701045006005Goemans H.E., Fey M. Risky but rational: war as an institutionally induced gamble. Journal of politics. 2008, Vol. 71, N 1, P. 35–54. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381608090038Goemans H.E., Fey M. Risky but rational: war as an institutionally induced gamble. Journal of politics. 2008, Vol. 71, N 1, P. 35–54. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381608090038Goemans H.E., Gleditsch K.S., Chiozza G. Introducing Archigos: a data set of political leaders. Journal of peace research. 2009, Vol. 46, N 2, P. 269–283. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308100719Goemans H.E., Gleditsch K.S., Chiozza G. Introducing Archigos: a data set of political leaders. Journal of peace research. 2009, Vol. 46, N 2, P. 269–283. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308100719Gurr T.R., Marshall M.G. Polity 5: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2018. Center for Systemic Peace, 2020, 28 p.Gurr T.R., Marshall M.G. Polity 5: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2018. Center for Systemic Peace, 2020, 28 p.Oneal J.R., Russett B.M., Berbaum M.L. Causes of peace: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885 – 1992. International studies quarterly. 2003, Vol. 47, N 3, P. 371–393. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2478.4703004Oneal J.R., Russett B.M., Berbaum M.L. Causes of peace: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885 – 1992. International studies quarterly. 2003, Vol. 47, N 3, P. 371–393. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2478.4703004Oneal J.R., Russett B.M. The classical liberals were right: democracy, interdependence and conflict, 1950–1985. International studies quarterly. 1997, Vol. 41, N 2, P. 267–294. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2478.00042Oneal J.R., Russett B.M. The classical liberals were right: democracy, interdependence and conflict, 1950–1985. International studies quarterly. 1997, Vol. 41, N 2, P. 267–294. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2478.00042Russett B.M., O’Neal J.R. Triangulating peace: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000, 394 p.Russett B.M., O’Neal J.R. Triangulating peace: democracy, interdependence, and international organizations. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000, 394 p.Tomz M. Domestic audience costs in international relations: an experimental approach. International organization. 2007, Vol. 61, N 4, P. 821–840. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070282Tomz M. Domestic audience costs in international relations: an experimental approach. International organization. 2007, Vol. 61, N 4, P. 821–840. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070282Trager R., Vavreck L. The political costs of crisis bargaining: presidential rhetoric and the role of party. American journal of political science. 2011, Vol. 55, N 3, P. 526–545. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.xTrager R., Vavreck L. The political costs of crisis bargaining: presidential rhetoric and the role of party. American journal of political science. 2011, Vol. 55, N 3, P. 526–545. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00521.xWintrobe R. The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge university press, 1998, 404 p.Wintrobe R. The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge university press, 1998, 404 p.Zeev M., Russett B. Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986. American political science review. 1993, Vol. 87, N 3, P. 624–638. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938740Zeev M., Russett B. Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986. American political science review. 1993, Vol. 87, N 3, P. 624–638. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938740

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.