politscienceПолитическая наукаPolitical science1998-1775ИНИОН РАН10.31249/poln/2025.03.07politscience-1221Research ArticleИДЕИ И ПРАКТИКАФормирование единого либерализованного энергетического рынка Европейского союзаFormation of a single liberalized energy market in the European UnionКавешниковН. Ю.KaveshnikovN. Y.

Кавешников Николай Юрьевич, кандидат политических наук, ведущий научный сотрудник

Москва

Kaveshnikov NikolayMoscow

n.kaveshnikov@inno.mgimo.ruИнститут Европы РАНРоссияInstitute of Europe of the Russian Academy of ScienceRussian Federation20251509202503Многоуровневая политика и политико-территориальная гетерогенность153181Copyright © Кавешников Н.Ю., 20252025Кавешников Н.Ю.Kaveshnikov N.Y.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/1221

     В статье анализируется функционирование многоуровневой системы управления в Европейском союзе на примере формирования единого либерализованного энергетического рынка ЕС. Исследование охватывает три этапа реформ (Первый, Второй и Третий энергетические пакеты). В качестве методологической основы использована концепция множественных потоков, адаптированная к специфике институциональной системы ЕС, и концепция принципал-агента. Задача исследования состоит в том, чтобы выявить: 1) факторы, определяющие степень и пределы автономии Европейской комиссии (ЕК) и ее возможности влиять на формирование политического курса; 2) стратегии, использованные ЕК для достижения своих целей; и 3) изменение стратегии ЕК на разных этапах либерализации энергетического рынка.     Учитывая масштаб сопротивления реформам и высокую политическую значимость вопроса, Комиссия последовательно придерживалась консенсусного подхода к разработке новых правил, чтобы обеспечить их легитимность и не дать государствам-членам явных поводов саботировать их исполнение. Стратегия Комиссии строилась на сочетании двух треков: законодательные реформы и использование инструментов политики конкуренции. Комиссия опиралась на стейкхолдеров и активно использовала информационную асимметрию. Но для того чтобы эти действия дали эффект, на первых этапах ЕК приложила много усилий, дабы объяснить стейкхолдерам выгоды конкурентного режима и создать механизмы получения информации о состоянии рынков. На начальных этапах реформы Комиссия действовала чрезвычайно мягко. На этапе обсуждения Третьего пакета Комиссия стала действовать гораздо активнее и жестче в связи с увеличением степени различия интересов государств-членов и появившейся возможностью маневрировать между ними. В долгосрочном плане Комиссия последовательно работала над формированием союзников внутри государств-членов в лице национальных регуляторов, стремясь расширить их полномочия и укрепить их независимость от национальных правительств.

The paper analyses the functioning of a multi-level governance in the European Union at the example of the development of a single liberalized energy market. The study covers three stages of reforms (the First, Second and Third energy packages). The concept of multiple flows, adapted to the specifics of the EU institutional system, and the concept of principal-agent are used as a methodological basis. The purpose of the study is to identify: 1) factors determining the degree and limits of the autonomy of the European Commission and its ability to influence policy formation; 2) strategies used by the Commission to achieve its goals; and 3) changes in the Commission strategy at different stages of energy market liberalization.Given the scale of the resistance to the reforms and the high political importance of the issue, the Commission has consistently followed a consensual approach to develop new rules in order to ensure their legitimacy and not give Member States clear reasons to sabotage implementation. The Commission's strategy was based on a combination of two tracks: legislative reforms and the use of competition policy instruments. The Commission relied on stakeholders and actively used information asymmetry. During the initial stages of the reform, the Commission was extremely prudent. While discussing the Third Package, the Commission acted much more actively and tougher due to the increasing divergence of the interests of the Member States and the opportunity to manoeuvre between them. In the long term, the Commission has consistently worked to form allies “within” the Member States – national energy regulators, seeking to expand their powers and strengthen their independence from national governments.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.