<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Publishing DTD v1.3 20210610//EN" "JATS-journalpublishing1-3.dtd">
<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">politscience</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Политическая наука</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Political science</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1998-1775</issn><publisher><publisher-name>ИНИОН РАН</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.31249/poln/2026.01.07</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">politscience-1282</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>КОНТЕКСТ</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Малые партии и партийные коалиции в странах Европы: почему одни набирают голоса после участия в правительстве, а другие теряют их?</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Small parties and party coalitions in Europe: why do some gain votes after participating in government, while other lose them?</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3856-2503</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Петров</surname><given-names>И. И.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Petrov</surname><given-names>I. I.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Петров Иван Игоревич - кандидат политических наук, старший преподаватель департамента политики и управления факультета социальных наук.</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Ivan I. Petrov.</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">ipetrov@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>HSE University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>15</day><month>03</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>1</issue><issue-title>Изменения в электоральном ландшафте: структурные и институциональные факторы</issue-title><fpage>137</fpage><lpage>159</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Петров И.И., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Петров И.И.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Petrov I.I.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/1282">https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/1282</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье анализируется, какое влияние оказывает участие малых партий в коалиционных правительствах на их электоральную поддержку. Хотя в многопартийных системах малые партии могут войти во власть посредством коалиций, преимущество крупных партий может свести на нет их усилия по продвижению своих требований, и платой за невыгодный компромисс станет отток голосов. Между тем можно предположить, что от особенностей структурного позиционирования малых партий в пространстве размежеваний, а также от использования институциональных механизмов, ассоциирующихся с защищенностью прав младших партнеров, может зависеть вариативность средних результатов малых партий по итогам их участия в коалициях. Изучив динамику голосования в 12 странах Европы с 2008 по 2025 г. посредством регрессионного анализа, мы пришли к выводу, что для партийных семейств, имеющих разное позиционирование и адресных избирателей, средние результаты на выборах в плане прироста голосов после участия в коалиции разнятся. При этом идеологическая дистанция между партиями в коалиции служит лучшим индикатором их относительного успеха. Как мы установили, «зеленые» и леворадикальные партии чаще выигрывают в коалициях, в то время как правые и леволиберальные малые партии – наоборот. Одной из возможных причин этого может быть характер электоральной опоры – если малая партия опирается на протестное или чисто прагматичное голосование, ее шансы выиграть в коалиции меньше, чем у партии, пользующейся более устойчивой поддержкой со стороны идейных, но не чуждых компромиссам избирателей.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>This article analyzes the impact of small parties’ participation in coalition governments on their electoral support. Although in multiparty systems, small parties can enter power through coalitions, the advantage of large parties can undermine their efforts to advance their demands, and the penalty for an unfavorable compromise will be a loss of votes. Meanwhile, it can be hypothesized that the structural positioning of small parties within cleavage spaces, as well as the use of institutional mechanisms associated with the protection of the rights of junior partners, may influence the variability of small parties’ average performance in coalitions. Using regression analysis to study voting dynamics in 12 European countries from 2008 to 2025, we concluded that party families with different positionings and target voters have different chances of winning electorally after participating in a coalition. Moreover, the ideological distance between parties in a coalition serves as the best predictor of their relative success. As we found, green and radical-left parties are more likely to win in coalitions, while right-wing and left-liberal small parties – less. One possible reason for this may be the nature of their electoral base: if a small party relies on protest or pragmatic voting, its chances of winning in coalition are lower than those of a party with more ideological, but still pragmatic support base.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>партии</kwd><kwd>коалиции</kwd><kwd>партийные размежевания</kwd><kwd>партийные семейства</kwd><kwd>европейская политика</kwd><kwd>популизм</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>parties</kwd><kwd>coalitions</kwd><kwd>party cleavages</kwd><kwd>party families</kwd><kwd>European politics</kwd><kwd>populism</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Климович С.А. В поисках единой теории коалиционного строительства: от методологического национализма к методологическому регионализму // Политическая наука. – 2018. – № 1. – С. 249–268.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bäck H., Hellström J., Lindvall J., Teorell J. Pre-electoral coalitions, familiarity, and delays in government formation. West European politics. 2024, Vol. 47, N 1, P. 88–112.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit2"><label>2</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Сидоров В.В. Теории формирования партийных коалиций в зарубежной политической науке // Политическая наука. – 2014. – № 1. – С. 211–222.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bergman M.E, Angelova M., Bäck H., Müller C. Coalition agreements and governments’ policy-making productivity. West European politics. 2024, Vol. 47, N 1, P. 31–60.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit3"><label>3</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Bergman T., Bäck H., Hellström J.(eds). Coalition governance in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2021, 776 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Bergman T., Bäck H., Hellström J.(eds). Coalition governance in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2021, 776 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit4"><label>4</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Browne E.C., Franklin M.N. Aspects of coalition payoffs in European parliamentary democracies. American political science review. 1973, Vol. 67, N 2, P. 453–469.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Browne E.C., Franklin M.N. Aspects of coalition payoffs in European parliamentary democracies. American political science review. 1973, Vol. 67, N 2, P. 453–469.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit5"><label>5</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Casal Bértoa F., Enyedi Z. Who governs Europe? A new historical dataset on governments and party systems since 1848. European political science. 2022, Vol. 21, N 1, P. 150–164.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Casal Bértoa F., Enyedi Z. Who governs Europe? A new historical dataset on governments and party systems since 1848. European political science. 2022, Vol. 21, N 1, P. 150–164.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit6"><label>6</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Dalton R.J. Economics, environmentalism and party alignments: A note on partisan change in advanced industrial democracies. European journal of political research. 2009, Vol. 48, N 2, P. 161–175.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Dalton R.J. Economics, environmentalism and party alignments: A note on partisan change in advanced industrial democracies. European journal of political research. 2009, Vol. 48, N 2, P. 161–175.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit7"><label>7</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Debus M. Pre-electoral commitments and government formation. Public choice. 2009, Vol. 138, N 1, P. 45–64.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Debus M. Pre-electoral commitments and government formation. Public choice. 2009, Vol. 138, N 1, P. 45–64.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit8"><label>8</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">De La Cerda N., Gunderson J.R. Are party families in Europe ideologically coherent today? European journal of political research. 2024, Vol. 63, N 3, P. 1208–1226.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">De La Cerda N., Gunderson J.R. Are party families in Europe ideologically coherent today? European journal of political research. 2024, Vol. 63, N 3, P. 1208–1226.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit9"><label>9</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Emanuele V., Chiaramonte A. A growing impact of new parties: Myth or reality? Party system innovation in Western Europe after 1945. Party politics. 2018, Vol. 24, N 5, P. 475–487.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Emanuele V., Chiaramonte A. A growing impact of new parties: Myth or reality? Party system innovation in Western Europe after 1945. Party politics. 2018, Vol. 24, N 5, P. 475–487.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit10"><label>10</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Fortunato D., Stevenson R.T. Perceptions of partisan ideologies: the effect of coalition participation. American journal of political science. 2013, Vol. 57, N 2, P. 459–477.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Fortunato D., Stevenson R.T. Perceptions of partisan ideologies: the effect of coalition participation. American journal of political science. 2013, Vol. 57, N 2, P. 459–477.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit11"><label>11</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Fortunato D. The electoral implications of coalition policy making. British journal of political science. 2019, Vol. 49, N 1, P. 59–80.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Fortunato D. The electoral implications of coalition policy making. British journal of political science. 2019, Vol. 49, N 1, P. 59–80.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit12"><label>12</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Gamson W.A. A theory of coalition formation. American sociological review. 1961, Vol. 26, N 3, P. 373–382.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Gamson W.A. A theory of coalition formation. American sociological review. 1961, Vol. 26, N 3, P. 373–382.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit13"><label>13</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Greene Z., Henceroth N., Jensen C.B. The cost of coalition compromise: The electoral effects of holding salient portfolios. Party politics. 2021, Vol. 27, N 4, P. 827–838.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Greene Z., Henceroth N., Jensen C.B. The cost of coalition compromise: The electoral effects of holding salient portfolios. Party politics. 2021, Vol. 27, N 4, P. 827–838.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit14"><label>14</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hooghe L., Marks G. How does the education cleavage stack up against the classic cleavages of the past? West European politics. 2025, P. 1–33.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Hooghe L., Marks G. How does the education cleavage stack up against the classic cleavages of the past? West European politics. 2025, P. 1–33.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit15"><label>15</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Hutter S., Kriesi H. (eds). European party politics in times of crisis. Cambridge university press, 2019, 444 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Hutter S., Kriesi H. (eds). European party politics in times of crisis. Cambridge university press, 2019, 444 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit16"><label>16</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Inglehart R.F., Norris P. Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: economic have-nots and cultural backlash. Cambridge: Harvard Kennedy school, 2016, 52 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Inglehart R.F., Norris P. Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: economic have-nots and cultural backlash. Cambridge: Harvard Kennedy school, 2016, 52 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit17"><label>17</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Katz R.S., Mair P. Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party. Party politics. 1995, Vol. 1, N 1, P. 5–28.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Katz R.S., Mair P. Changing models of party organization and party democracy: the emergence of the cartel party. Party politics. 1995, Vol. 1, N 1, P. 5–28.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit18"><label>18</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Kitschelt H. Party families and political ideologies. In: Rickard S.J. (ed.) Oxford research encyclopedia of politics. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2018. Mode of access: https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-626 (accessed: 22.12.2025).</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Kitschelt H. Party families and political ideologies. In: Rickard S.J. (ed.) Oxford research encyclopedia of politics. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2018. Mode of access: https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-626 (accessed: 22.12.2025).</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit19"><label>19</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Klimovich S.А. In search for a unified theory of coalition construction: From methodological nationalism to methodological regionalism. Political science (RU). 2018, N 1, P. 249–268. (In Russ.)</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Klimovich S.А. In search for a unified theory of coalition construction: From methodological nationalism to methodological regionalism. Political science (RU). 2018, N 1, P. 249–268. (In Russ.)</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit20"><label>20</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Klüver H., Spoon J.J. Helping or hurting? How governing as a junior coalition partner influences electoral outcomes. The journal of politics. 2020, Vol. 82, N 4, P. 1231–1242.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Klüver H., Spoon J.J. Helping or hurting? How governing as a junior coalition partner influences electoral outcomes. The journal of politics. 2020, Vol. 82, N 4, P. 1231–1242.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit21"><label>21</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lipset S.M., Rokkan S. Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives. New York: Free Press, 1967, 554 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Lipset S.M., Rokkan S. Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives. New York: Free Press, 1967, 554 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit22"><label>22</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Lupia A., Strøm K. Coalition Termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections. American political science review. 1995, Vol. 89, N 3, P. 648–665.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Lupia A., Strøm K. Coalition Termination and the strategic timing of parliamentary elections. American political science review. 1995, Vol. 89, N 3, P. 648–665.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit23"><label>23</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Mair P., Mudde C. The party family and its study. Annual review of political science. 1998, Vol. 1, N 1, P. 211–229.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Mair P., Mudde C. The party family and its study. Annual review of political science. 1998, Vol. 1, N 1, P. 211–229.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit24"><label>24</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Martin L.W., Vanberg G. Coalition policymaking and legislative review. American Political science review. 2005, Vol. 99, N 1, P. 93–106.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Martin L.W., Vanberg G. Coalition policymaking and legislative review. American Political science review. 2005, Vol. 99, N 1, P. 93–106.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit25"><label>25</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Meguid B.M. Competition between unequals: The role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success. American political science review. 2005, Vol. 99, N 3, P. 347–359.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Meguid B.M. Competition between unequals: The role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success. American political science review. 2005, Vol. 99, N 3, P. 347–359.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit26"><label>26</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Oesch D., Rennwald L. Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right. European journal of political research. 2018, Vol. 57, N 4, P. 783–807.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Oesch D., Rennwald L. Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right. European journal of political research. 2018, Vol. 57, N 4, P. 783–807.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit27"><label>27</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">So F. Serious conflicts with benign outcomes? The electoral consequences of conflictual cabinet terminations. American political science review. 2024, Vol. 118, N 3, P. 1449–1463.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">So F. Serious conflicts with benign outcomes? The electoral consequences of conflictual cabinet terminations. American political science review. 2024, Vol. 118, N 3, P. 1449–1463.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit28"><label>28</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Robinson J. A. Decision-making and coalition building: a review: William H. Riker, the theory of political coalitions. Journal of conflict resolution. 1963, Vol. 7, N 4, P. 763–768.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Robinson J. A. Decision-making and coalition building: a review: William H. Riker, the theory of political coalitions. Journal of conflict resolution. 1963, Vol. 7, N 4, P. 763–768.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit29"><label>29</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Sidorov V.V. Theory of coalition formation in foreign political science. Political science (RU). 2014, N 1, P. 211–222. (In Russ.)</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Sidorov V.V. Theory of coalition formation in foreign political science. Political science (RU). 2014, N 1, P. 211–222. (In Russ.)</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit30"><label>30</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Strøm K.A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American journal of political science. 1990, Vol. 34, N 2, P. 565–598.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Strøm K.A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American journal of political science. 1990, Vol. 34, N 2, P. 565–598.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit31"><label>31</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Strøm K., Müller W.C., Bergman T. Cabinets and coalition bargaining: the democratic life cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2010, 464 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Strøm K., Müller W.C., Bergman T. Cabinets and coalition bargaining: the democratic life cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2010, 464 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit32"><label>32</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Volkens A., Barra J., Budge I., McDonald M.D. (eds). Mapping policy preferences from texts: statistical solutions for manifesto analysts. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2014, 346 p.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Volkens A., Barra J., Budge I., McDonald M.D. (eds). Mapping policy preferences from texts: statistical solutions for manifesto analysts. Oxford: Oxford university press, 2014, 346 p.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref><ref id="cit33"><label>33</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Warwick P.V., Druckman J.N. Portfolio salience and the proportionality of payoffs in coalition governments. British journal of political science. 2001, Vol. 31, N 4, P. 627–649.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Warwick P.V., Druckman J.N. Portfolio salience and the proportionality of payoffs in coalition governments. British journal of political science. 2001, Vol. 31, N 4, P. 627–649.</mixed-citation></citation-alternatives></ref></ref-list><fn-group><fn fn-type="conflict"><p>The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article>
