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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">politscience</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Политическая наука</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Political science</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">1998-1775</issn><publisher><publisher-name>ИНИОН РАН</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.31249/poln/2026.03.06</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">politscience-1380</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ИДЕИ И ПРАКТИКА</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Идеологическая дистанция и ловушки шантажного потенциала: структурные факторы создания правительственных коалиций в Латинской Америке</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Ideological distance and the trap of blackmail potential: structural factors of government coalition formation in Latin America</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1908-0613</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Харитонова</surname><given-names>О. Г.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kharitonova</surname><given-names>O. G.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Харитонова Оксана Геннадьевна, доцент кафедры сравнительной политологии</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Kharitonova Oxana</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">o.haritonova@inno.mgimo.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5457-5588</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Мальченко</surname><given-names>А. А.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Malchenko</surname><given-names>A. A.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Мальченко Ангелина Александровна, аспирант Кафедры сравнительной политологии, преподаватель Кафедры государственного управления</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Malchenko Angelina</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">an.malashenkova@my.mgimo.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Московский государственный институт международных отношений (университет) Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>MGIMO University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>02</day><month>09</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>3</issue><issue-title>Институциональный порядок в России и мире: теория и практики в ракурсе институциональной политологии</issue-title><fpage>103</fpage><lpage>131</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Харитонова О.Г., Мальченко А.А., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Харитонова О.Г., Мальченко А.А.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Kharitonova O.G., Malchenko A.A.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/1380">https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/1380</self-uri><abstract><p>Традиционное представление об отсутствии необходимости создания правительственных коалиций в президентских системах находит опровержение на примере конкретных политических систем стран Латинской Америки. Более ранние исследования подтверждают, что на процесс формирования партиями коалиций прямое влияние оказывает не столько формально закрепленный дизайн политической системы, сколько характеристики политических партий и институты, обеспечивающие их взаимодействие в рамках данной системы. В данной статье рассматривается феномен создания правительственных коалиций в странах Латинской Америки на примере 11 устойчивых президентских многопартийных систем региона (Аргентина, Боливия, Бразилия, Венесуэла, Колумбия, Мексика, Парагвай, Перу, Чили, Эквадор, Уругвай). Цель исследования заключается в выявлении факторов, оказывающих наибольшее влияние на формирование правительственной коалиции в президентской системе. Проведен анализ необходимых условий (NCA) и качественный сравнительный анализ (QCA) для выявления необходимых условий и достаточных конфигураций факторов создания правительственных коалиций в странах Латинской Америки. Выявлены и объяснены типичные и девиантные случаи, отражающие логику создания правительственных коалиций в президентских системах. Проведен анализ вероятности вхождения в коалицию отдельных партий. В качестве наблюдений выступают политические партии, участвовавшие в общенациональных выборах последних двух электоральных циклов (2017–2019 гг. и 2021–2024 гг.) и прошедшие порог в 1% мест. По результатам количественного анализа построены модели зависимости включения политической партии в коалицию от ресурсного и позиционного факторов, подтверждена значимость идеологической дистанции, выявлено пороговое значение процента мест партии в нижней палате парламента и обнаружено разнонаправленное влияние коалиционного и шантажного потенциалов партий на вероятность вхождения в коалицию.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Conventional wisdom on the redundancy of coalitions under presidentialism is refuted by political systems in Latin American countries. Earlier studies confirmed that coalition formation process was not directly influenced by political system design, but rather by the characteristics of political parties and institutions that ensure their interaction within the system. The article examines the phenomenon of party coalitions in Latin American presidential and semi-presidential systems on the sample of 11 multiparty consolidated systems (Argentina, Bolivia,   Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay). The study was aimed to assess the impact of structural factors on government coalition formation at the country and party levels. The necessary conditions analysis (NCA) and the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) identified necessary conditions and sufficient configuration of coalition building at the country level with typical and deviant cases located and qualitatively described. Logistic regression analysis modeled the probability of individual parties joining a coalition. The 215 party-level observations included political parties, which participated in the national elections of the last two electoral cycles (2017–2019 and 2021–2024) and crossed the threshold of 1% of seats. The study confirmed the hypotheses on the relationship between political party's coalition membership and its structural and positional characteristics, proved the   significance of ideological distance from the president, identified the critical seat threshold in the lower chamber and compared the counter-directional influence of the coalition and blackmail potentials of parties on the likelihood of joining the coalition.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>правительственная коалиция</kwd><kwd>президентская система</kwd><kwd>Латинская Америка</kwd><kwd>идеологическая дистанция</kwd><kwd>идеологическая поляризация</kwd><kwd>шантажный потенциал</kwd><kwd>коалиционный потенциал</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>government coalition</kwd><kwd>presidential system</kwd><kwd>Latin America</kwd><kwd>ideological distance</kwd><kwd>ideological polarization</kwd><kwd>blackmail potential</kwd><kwd>coalition potential</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Барабаш Б.А. 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