politscienceПолитическая наукаPolitical science1998-1775ИНИОН РАНpolitscience-328Research ArticleПЕРВАЯ СТЕПЕНЬКОНЦЕПЦИЯ ВЕТО-ИГРОКОВ: НОВЫЙ ПОДХОД В ИЗУЧЕНИИ ФОРМ ПРАВЛЕНИЯThe concept of veto players: A new approach to the study of forms of governmentПомигуевИлья АлександровичPomiguevI. A.pomilya@mail.ruИНИОН РАНРоссия20141105202301Формы правления в современном мире199210Copyright © Помигуев И.А., 20232023Помигуев И.А.Pomiguev I.A.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/328

В статье представлены основные положения концепции вето-игроков, предложенной Дж. Цебелисом. Рассматриваются ключевые понятия, используемые в данной концепции, принципы и способы определения вето-игроков, результаты их взаимодействия и влияния на политическую систему. Кроме того, в статье проанализированы преимущества и недостатки концепции, перспективы ее дальнейшего применения для исследования российской политики.

The article presents the main ideas of the of G. Tsebelis' veto-players theory. The author examines key terms used in this concept, principles and methods of definition of the veto players, the results of their interaction and influence on the political system. In addition, the author analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the concept, prospects of its further application in Russia.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.