politscienceПолитическая наукаPolitical science1998-1775ИНИОН РАНpolitscience-415Research ArticleРАКУРСЫТЕОРИЯ КОРРУПЦИОННЫХ РЫНКОВTheory of corruption marketsВасильеваВ. В.VasilevaV. M.noemail@neicon.ruВоробьевА. Н.VorobyevA. N.noemail@neicon.ru20151105202302Познавательные возможности политической науки232252Copyright © Васильева В.В., Воробьев А.Н., 20232023Васильева В.В., Воробьев А.Н.Vasileva V.M., Vorobyev A.N.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/415

На основании анализа методологии и направлений изучения коррупции в реферируемых публикациях (1900-2015) авторы выделяют основные недостатки существующей теоретической базы, в частности «упущенный фактор» предыдущих исследований, которым является коррупционный рынок. В статье представлены методологические основания новой теории среднего уровня в исследованиях коррупции - теории коррупционных рынков, позволяющей объяснить разные результаты применения одинаковых антикоррупционных мер.

Authors reveal main theoretical disadvantages of the field of corruption studies, including «the missing factor» of corruption studies - corruption market. This paper provides methodology for the new middle-ranged theory of corruption markets that explains different results of the same anticorruption reforms.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.