politscienceПолитическая наукаPolitical science1998-1775ИНИОН РАНpolitscience-510Research ArticleКОНТЕКСТОб измерении влияния государств на принятие политических решений на примере голосований в институтах Европейского союзаOn measurement of states’ power on political decision-making on the example of votings in European Union institutionsКамаловаРита УльфатовнаKamalovaRitarkamalova@hse.ruНИУ ВШЭРоссияNational Research University Higher School of EconomicsRussian Federation20161205202304Государства в современном мире: Новые подходы к исследованию214241Copyright © Камалова Р.У., 20232023Камалова Р.У.Kamalova R.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/510

Рассматривается задача измерения влияния участников голосований на принятие решений классическими индексами влияния и индексами влияния, учитывающими предпочтения по формированию коалиций. Приводится формальное определение для обоих типов индексов, обсуждаются ограничения применимости. Применение индексов влияния продемонстрировано на примере Совета министров ЕС и Европейского парламента.

We discuss the problem of measurement of voting power distribution by means of classical power indices and power indices that take into account preferences in coalition formation. Examples of application to power distribution in the Council of the European Union and in the European Parliament are preceded by formal definition of the both types of indices, history of invention and discussion about limits to applicability.

измерение влиянияиндексы влиянияпредпочтения по формированию коалицийвлияние с учетом предпочтенийприложения индексов влиянияСовет министров ЕСЕвропейский парламентvoting power measurementvoting power indicespreferences on coalition formationvoting power with preferences on coalition formationapplication of voting power indicesCouncil of Ministers of EUEuropean parliamentReferencesАлескеров Ф.Т. Индексы влияния, учитывающие предпочтения участников по созданию коалиций // Доклады Академии наук. - М., 2007. - Т. 414, № 5. - С. 594-597.Алескеров Ф.Т. Индексы влияния, учитывающие предпочтения участников по созданию коалиций // Доклады Академии наук. - М., 2007. - Т. 414, № 5. - С. 594-597.Вебер М. Основные социологические понятия («Хозяйство и общество», гл. 1) [1921] // Теоретическая социология: Антология: В 2 ч. / Под ред. С.П. Баньковской. - М.: Университет, 2002. - Ч. 1. - С. 70-146.Вебер М. 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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.