politscienceПолитическая наукаPolitical science1998-1775ИНИОН РАН10.31249/poln/2023.01.02politscience-6Research ArticleСОСТОЯНИЕ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫОтношения между легислатурами и немажоритарными институтами как предмет законодательных исследованийRelations between legislatures and non-majority institutions as a subject of legislative studiesГригорьевИ. С.GrigorievI.

Григорьев Иван Сергеевич, кандидат политических наук, доцент департамента политологии и международных отношений

Санкт-Петербург

St. Petersburg

igrigoriev@hse.ruРодионоваЕ. А.RodionovaE.

Родионова Елизавета Александровна, стажер-исследователь Центра сравнительных исследований власти и управления

Санкт-Петербург

St. Petersburg

earodionova@edu.hse.ruНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»РоссияHSE UniversityRussian Federation1005202301Законодательные исследования в политической науке4260Copyright © Григорьев И.С., Родионова Е.А., 19701970Григорьев И.С., Родионова Е.А.Grigoriev I., Rodionova E.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/6

В данной статье освещаются различные аспекты отношений между выборными легислатурами (в широком смысле - мажоритарными институтами) и немажоритарными институтами (исполнительными агентствами, центральными банками и т.д.). К этой тематике относятся сюжеты эффективного делегирования полномочий и факторов, при которых осуществляется такое делегирование, а также инструментов, которые легислатуры могут применять для извлечения максимальной пользы от этого. В частности, на основании новейшей литературы по рассматриваемой теме мы показываем, что к основным изучаемым инструментам делегирования относятся подбор агента принципалом, формальное регулирование его деятельности, а также неформальные попытки влиять на такую деятельность с помощью ограничений и угроз. При этом малоизученными остаются вопросы собственно деятельности немажоритарных институтов по расширению их полномочий и наращиванию имеющейся у них фактической дискреции. Отдельной перспективной темой является изучение положения немажоритарных институтов в обстоятельствах, где формальная институциональная структура не может служить для них достаточной гарантией независимости и им приходится защищаться от нападок со стороны легислатур и выборных политиков или, во всяком случае, ожидать таких нападок, соответствующим образом адаптируя свою деятельность.

This review highlights various aspects of the relationship between elected legislatures (that in the broad sense could be called the majoritarian institutions) and the non-majoritarian institutions (such as executive agencies, central banks, etc.). The topics covered include efficient delegation of authority from principal to agent, the correlates of such efficient delegation, as well as the tools that legislatures might use to maximize the utility they derive from such delegation. Based on the state-of-the-art literature on the topic of delegation from majoritarian to non-majoritarian institutions, we show that the main instruments of delegation include selection of an agent by the principal; the formal regulation of the agent’s activities by the principal; as well as using informal restrictions and threats to influence the agent’s activities. At the same time, the non-majoritarian institutions’ activities and strategies to expand their competences and increase their actual discretion remain poorly studied. An additional promising area of research is the non-majoritarian institutions’ positioning and strategizing under circumstances where the existent formal institutional structure cannot serve as a sufficient guarantee of their autonomy and independence. Placed in such dire conditions, they can be assumed to try and defend themselves against attacks by the legislatures and elected politicians, or at least to adapt their activities accordingly in anticipation of a possibility of such hostile behaviour. 

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.