politscienceПолитическая наукаPolitical science1998-1775ИНИОН РАН10.31249/poln/2022.02.10politscience-753Research ArticleПЕРВАЯ СТЕПЕНЬВлияние коалиций давления на оборонную политику в России: случай реформы СердюковаThe role of advocacy coalitions in Russia’s defense policies: the case of Serdyukov reformШамиевК. В.ShamievK.

Шамиев Кирилл Вячеславович, младший научный сотрудник Центра сравнительных исследований власти и управления; PhD candidate

Санкт-Петербург

Вена, Австрия

Shamiev Kirill, HSE University

St. Petersburg

Vienna, Austria

kshamiev@hse.ruНациональный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»; Центрально-европейский университетРоссияHSE University; Central European UniversityRussian Federation20221305202302Политика в трудные времена: вызовы и ответы206229Copyright © Шамиев К.В., 20232023Шамиев К.В.Shamiev K.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/753

В 2007-2012 гг. российские вооруженные силы прошли через беспрецедентные изменения, которые затронули все элементы военной организации. Несмотря на политическую и финансовую поддержку со стороны президента и премьер-министра, реформаторам не удалось достигнуть всех целей реформ, а часть изменений была замедлена или отменена. Используя данные 18 экспертных интервью, проведенных с учеными, журналистами и бывшими высокопоставленными военными, опираясь на концепцию коалиций давления, исследование показывает что Министерство обороны не смогло реализовать некоторые изменения из-за противостояния министру внутри военной и президентской коалиций гражданско-военных отношений. Межведомственное сопротивление вынудило Министерство обороны отказаться от некоторых изменений, а часть других была отменена уже после отставки министра Сердюкова. Статья демонстрирует стратегии, которые использовали реформаторы, чтобы реализовать свои цели и преодолеть сопротивление мобилизованных противников реформы. Сопротивление в итоге привело к отставке министра обороны, что остановило дальнейшие радикальные изменения в российских вооруженных силах. Полученные результаты показывают, что даже полная политическая поддержка со стороны авторитарного лидера не может спасти политиков и их программы от влияния других акторов. Недовольство изменениями вызывает раскол в президентской коалиции и ослабляет межведомственное взаимодействие, что ослабляет управленческие позиции реформатора. Более того, изучаемый случай показал, что в гражданско-военных отношениях большую роль играет не только фактическая составляющая реформы, но и соответствие поведения реформатора доминирующим убеждениям военнослужащих.

Between 2007 and 2012, the Russian armed forces went through unprecedented changes that affected all elements of the military organization. Despite political and financial support from the president and prime minister, the reformers could not meet all reform goals, and some changes were slowed down or backpaddled. The research uses data from 18 expert interviews, online media materials and employs the advocacy coalition framework to show that the Ministry of Defense has been unable to implement some changes because of the opposition within the military and presidential coalitions of civil-military relations. Interagency resistance forced the Ministry of Defense to abandon some of the changes. Some others were canceled after Minister Serdyukov’s ouster. This article demonstrates the strategies that the reformers used to pursue their goals and overcome the resistance from the reform opponents. The resistance eventually led to the defence minister's resignation, which halted further radical changes in the Russian armed forces. The results show that even the full political support from an authoritarian leader cannot save politicians and their programs from the influence of other actors. Dissatisfaction with the changes split the presidential coalition. It also damaged the interagency interaction, which ultimately weakened the managerial position of the reformer. Moreover, this case study showed that in civil-military relations, the conformity of the reformer’s behavior with the dominant military beliefs plays a major role alongside the factual component of reform.

оборонная политикагражданско-военные отношенияреформа армииМедведевполитические курсыкоалиции давленияdefense policycivil-military relationsmilitary reformMedvedevpolicymakingadvocacy coalitionsИсследование осуществлено в рамках Программы фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ в 2021 г.ReferencesArbatov A.G. The transformation of Russian military doctrine: lessons learned from Kosovo and Chechnya. Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C Marshall Center, European Center For Security Studies, 2000, 62 p. EDN: UCSYXHArbatov A.G. The transformation of Russian military doctrine: lessons learned from Kosovo and Chechnya. Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C Marshall Center, European Center For Security Studies, 2000, 62 p. EDN: UCSYXHBarabanov M. (ed.).Russia's new army. Moscow: Centre for analysis of strategies and technology, 2011, 120 p. (In Russ.).Barabanov M. (ed.).Russia's new army. Moscow: Centre for analysis of strategies and technology, 2011, 120 p. (In Russ.).Binderkrantz A.S., Christiansen P.M., Pedersen H.H.Interest group access to the bureaucracy, parliament, and the media. Governance. 2015, Vol. 28, N 1, P. 95-112. DOI: 10.1111/gove.12089Binderkrantz A.S., Christiansen P.M., Pedersen H.H.Interest group access to the bureaucracy, parliament, and the media. Governance. 2015, Vol. 28, N 1, P. 95-112. DOI: 10.1111/gove.12089Cairney P. Understanding public policy: theories and issues. London: Macmillan International Higher Education, 2011, 346 p.Cairney P. Understanding public policy: theories and issues. London: Macmillan International Higher Education, 2011, 346 p.Dvorkin V., Arbatov A. Military reform in Russia: Current state and future prospects.Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2013, 79 p. (In Russ.).Dvorkin V., Arbatov A. Military reform in Russia: Current state and future prospects.Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2013, 79 p. (In Russ.).Dyson D.T. German military reform 1998-2004: leadership and the triumph of domestic constraint over international opportunity. European security. 2005, Vol. 14, N 3, P. 361-386. DOI: 10.1080/09662830500407929Dyson D.T. German military reform 1998-2004: leadership and the triumph of domestic constraint over international opportunity. European security. 2005, Vol. 14, N 3, P. 361-386. DOI: 10.1080/09662830500407929Feaver P. Armed servants: agency, oversight, and civil-military relations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university press, 2005, 400 p.Feaver P. Armed servants: agency, oversight, and civil-military relations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university press, 2005, 400 p.Geddes B., Frantz E., Wright J.G. Military rule. Annual review of political science. 2014, Vol. 17, N 1, P. 147-162. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418Geddes B., Frantz E., Wright J.G. Military rule. Annual review of political science. 2014, Vol. 17, N 1, P. 147-162. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-213418Gel'man V. Authoritarian modernization in Russia: ideas, institutions, and policies.London: Routledge, 2016, 324 p. EDN: SMOMDIGel'man V. Authoritarian modernization in Russia: ideas, institutions, and policies.London: Routledge, 2016, 324 p. EDN: SMOMDIGiles K. Who gives the orders in the new Russian military? Research Paper N 74.Rome: NATO Defense college, 2012, 12 p.Giles K. Who gives the orders in the new Russian military? Research Paper N 74.Rome: NATO Defense college, 2012, 12 p.Golts A. Military reform and militarism in Russia. Upsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2017, 315 p.Golts A. Military reform and militarism in Russia. Upsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2017, 315 p.Herspring D.R., McDermott R.N. Serdyukov promotes systemic Russian military reform.Orbis. 2010, Vol. 54, N 2, P. 284-301. DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2010.01.004Herspring D.R., McDermott R.N. Serdyukov promotes systemic Russian military reform.Orbis. 2010, Vol. 54, N 2, P. 284-301. DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2010.01.004Huntington S.P. The soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil-military relations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957, 564 p.Huntington S.P. The soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil-military relations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957, 564 p.Irondelle B. Europeanization without the European Union? French military reforms 1991-96. Journal of European public policy. 2003, Vol. 10, N 2, P. 208-226. DOI: 10.1080/1350176032000059008Irondelle B. Europeanization without the European Union? French military reforms 1991-96. Journal of European public policy. 2003, Vol. 10, N 2, P. 208-226. DOI: 10.1080/1350176032000059008Janowitz M. The professional soldier: a social and political portrait. New York: free press, 1960, 488 p.Janowitz M. The professional soldier: a social and political portrait. New York: free press, 1960, 488 p.Jenkins-Smith H., Silva L.C., Gupta K., Ripberger T.J. Belief system continuity and change in policy advocacy coalitions: using cultural theory to specify belief systems,coalitions, and sources of change. Policy studies journal. 2014, Vol. 42, N 4, P. 484508. DOI: 10.1111/psj.12071Jenkins-Smith H., Silva L.C., Gupta K., Ripberger T.J. Belief system continuity and change in policy advocacy coalitions: using cultural theory to specify belief systems,coalitions, and sources of change. Policy studies journal. 2014, Vol. 42, N 4, P. 484508. DOI: 10.1111/psj.12071Levy Y. What is controlled by civilian control of the military? Control of the military vs. control of militarization. Armed forces and society. 2016, Vol. 42, N 1, P. 75-98. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X14567918 EDN: RJNPLCLevy Y. What is controlled by civilian control of the military? Control of the military vs. control of militarization. Armed forces and society. 2016, Vol. 42, N 1, P. 75-98. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X14567918 EDN: RJNPLCNoble B. Authoritarian amendments: legislative institutions as intraexecutive constraints in Post-Soviet Russia.Comparative political studies. 2020, Vol. 53, N 9, P. 1417-1454. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010414018797941. EDN: VEZYFTNoble B. Authoritarian amendments: legislative institutions as intraexecutive constraints in Post-Soviet Russia.Comparative political studies. 2020, Vol. 53, N 9, P. 1417-1454. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010414018797941. EDN: VEZYFTNwalie M.I. Advocacy coalition framework and policy changes in a third-world country. Politics & policy. 2019, Vol. 47, N 3, P. 545-568. 10.1111/polp. 12302. DOI: 10.1111/polp.12302Nwalie M.I. Advocacy coalition framework and policy changes in a third-world country. Politics & policy. 2019, Vol. 47, N 3, P. 545-568. 10.1111/polp. 12302. DOI: 10.1111/polp.12302Pierce J.J., Peterson H.L., Hicks K.C. Policy change: an advocacy coalition framework perspective. Policy studies journal. 2020, Vol. 48, N 1, P. 64-86. DOI: 10.1111/psj.12223Pierce J.J., Peterson H.L., Hicks K.C. Policy change: an advocacy coalition framework perspective. Policy studies journal. 2020, Vol. 48, N 1, P. 64-86. DOI: 10.1111/psj.12223Renz B.Russia's military revival. Cambridge: Polity, 2018, 240 p.Renz B.Russia's military revival. Cambridge: Polity, 2018, 240 p.Rohlfing I. Case studies and causal inference: an integrative framework. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 272 p.Rohlfing I. Case studies and causal inference: an integrative framework. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 272 p.Sabatier P., Weible C. The advocacy coalition framework: innovations and clarifications. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007, 220 p.Sabatier P., Weible C. The advocacy coalition framework: innovations and clarifications. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007, 220 p.Shamiev K. Civil-military relations and Russia's Post-Soviet military culture: a belief system analysis. Armed forces and society. 2021, P. 1-24. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X211062932Shamiev K. Civil-military relations and Russia's Post-Soviet military culture: a belief system analysis. Armed forces and society. 2021, P. 1-24. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X211062932Soeters J. Organizational cultures in the military. In: G. Caforio, M. Nuciari (eds). Handbook of the sociology of the military handbooks of sociology and social research. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018, P. 251-272.Soeters J. Organizational cultures in the military. In: G. Caforio, M. Nuciari (eds). Handbook of the sociology of the military handbooks of sociology and social research. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018, P. 251-272.Stepan A.C. Rethinking military politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton university press, 1988, 192 p.Stepan A.C. Rethinking military politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton university press, 1988, 192 p.Stykow P. The devil in the details: constitutional regime types in post-Soviet Eurasia. Post-Soviet affairs. 2019, Vol. 35, N 2, P. 122-139. DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2018.1553437 EDN: YGNWIMStykow P. The devil in the details: constitutional regime types in post-Soviet Eurasia. Post-Soviet affairs. 2019, Vol. 35, N 2, P. 122-139. DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2018.1553437 EDN: YGNWIMSvolik M.W. The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2012, 253 p.Svolik M.W. The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2012, 253 p.Thomas G.B. External shocks, conflict and learning as interactive sources of change in U.S. security policy. Journal of public policy. 1999, Vol. 19, N 2, P. 209-231. DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X99000239 EDN: FOQGRBThomas G.B. External shocks, conflict and learning as interactive sources of change in U.S. security policy. Journal of public policy. 1999, Vol. 19, N 2, P. 209-231. DOI: 10.1017/S0143814X99000239 EDN: FOQGRBWilson K. Modernization or more of the same in Russia: was there a "thaw" under Medvedev? Problems of Post-Communism. 2015, Vol. 62, N 3, P. 145-158. DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2015.1019803 EDN: WTXHFNWilson K. Modernization or more of the same in Russia: was there a "thaw" under Medvedev? Problems of Post-Communism. 2015, Vol. 62, N 3, P. 145-158. DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2015.1019803 EDN: WTXHFNНовая армия России / под ред. М. Барабанова. - М.: Центр анализа стратегий и технологий, 2010. - 168 с.Новая армия России / под ред. М. Барабанова. - М.: Центр анализа стратегий и технологий, 2010. - 168 с.Дворкин В., Арбатов А. Военная реформа России: состояние и перспективы. - М: Моск. Центр Карнеги, 2013. - 79 с.Дворкин В., Арбатов А. Военная реформа России: состояние и перспективы. - М: Моск. Центр Карнеги, 2013. - 79 с.

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.