politscienceПолитическая наукаPolitical science1998-1775ИНИОН РАН10.31249/poln/2021.02.01politscience-819Research ArticleСОСТОЯНИЕ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫПолитические институты и экономический рост: исследования взаимосвязиThe interdependence between political institutions and economic growthПармаР. В.ParmaR. V.

Парма Роман Васильевич, кандидат политических наук, доцент Департамента политологии

Москва

Moscow

RVParma@fa.ruФинансовый университет при Правительстве Российской ФедерацииРоссияFinancial University under the Government of the Russian FederationRussian Federation20211805202302Институциональные реформы1341Copyright © Парма Р.В., 20232023Парма Р.В.Parma R.V.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://www.politnauka.ru/jour/article/view/819

В статье рассматривается вопрос о взаимозависимости изменений политических институтов и динамики экономического роста. Данный дискуссионный вопрос является камнем преткновения в обширных исследованиях, обусловленных столкновением двух больших теорий общественного развития в политической науке: демократизации и модернизации. Теория демократизации основывается на примате гражданских ценностей, а теория модернизации отдает приоритет эффективности экономического развития. Автором определены концептуальные позиции исследователей: демократия способствует росту, демократия не способствует росту, рост способствует демократии, рост не способствует демократии. Доминирующая позиция демократия способствует экономическому росту обусловлена ценностями либеральной идеологии и представлениями о свободном рынке. Оппонирующая позиция демократия не способствует экономическому росту исходит из слабых возможностей установленного либерального порядка проводить мобилизацию ресурсов для решения задач государственного развития. Модернизационная позиция экономический рост способствует демократии диктуется изменением ценностных установок граждан по мере достижения благосостояния. Альтернативная позиция экономический рост не способствует демократии подкреплена «отклоняющимися случаями» стремительного развития стран с авторитарными режимами. Автор приходит к заключению в возможностях многовариантного конструирования политических институтов для обеспечения экономического роста, исходя из существующих эндогенных и экзогенных факторов в развитии каждой страны.

The article concerns on the correlations between the changes in political institutions and the dynamics of economic growth. This controversial issue is a stumbling block in extensive research due to the clash of two large theories of social development in political science: democratization and modernization. The theory of democratization is based on the primacy of civic values, while the theory of modernization gives priority to the efficiency of economic development. The author defines the conceptual positions of the researchers: “democracy promotes growth”, “democracy does not promote growth”, “growth promotes democracy”, and “growth does not promote democracy”. The dominant position “democracy promotes economic growth” is driven by the values of liberal ideology and the notion of a free market. The opposing position “democracy does not contribute to economic growth” proceeds from the weak possibilities of the established liberal order to mobilize resources for solving the state development problems. The modernization position “economic growth contributes to democracy” is dictated by the change in the value attitudes of citizens as they achieve prosperity. The alternative position “economic growth is not conducive to democracy” is supported by countries with authoritarian regimes with weak potential of development. The author comes to the conclusion about the possibilities of multivariate construction of political institutions to ensure economic growth, based on the endogenous and exogenous development factors in any countries.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.