The author offers an understanding of justice as equality, which can be used as the basis for our judgments about justice, and thus overcome the existing skepticism about justice. First, with the help of the neo-Kantian philosophy of law, the position of moral cognitivism is substantiated. Further, the importance of consistency in the normative analysis of existing social relations is substantiated. Hence, not only the possibility, but also the necessity for the development of a general principle of justice is derived. This principle is expected to underlie more specific normative research. As result, an understanding of justice as equality is proposed. While equality can be understood differently, it is clarified that the principle of equality means the equal care and respect (the same is the equal value of persons, the equal importance of everyone's  interests). This understanding of equality is justified as a commonplace of modern justice research. For this purpose, the author briefly analyzes the main political and legal theories of the twentieth century. The priority of the ideal of equality over the ideal of maximizing freedom is justified. It is demonstrated that freedom can be limited considering the peculiarities of the legal and political consciousness of society, moral requirements, as well as in cases where there is no doubt that these restrictions on freedom serve the interests of persons whose freedom is limited. It is clarified that both the general principle of equality and the more specific principles of justice may be revised over time.