A fixed date of parliamentary election as a new format of interaction between legislative and executive power in the UK and Canada

The article analyzes a new phenomenon in the legislation and political practice of the Great Britain and Canada – the establishment of a fixed date for the elections of legislatures. In 2011, the UK passed the Fixed Term Parliaments Act (repealed in 2022), which the first time legislated a fixed date for elections to the House of Commons. Before and after the repeal of this Act, elections by law must be held at least once every five years, but the Prime Minister could and can advise the monarch to use the royal prerogative of early dissolution of parliament. The author examines the political conditions for the adoption and repeal of this Act, the arguments of its supporters and opponents, ways of «bypassing» the Act. The author concludes that the introduction of a fixed term for the House of Commons had practically no effect on the prime minister's freedom of action to call early elections. Historically, the dates for elections to the Canadian Parliament and the provincial legislatures of Canada were not fixed and were determined by the prime minister and provincial premiers at their discretion, which was criticized because it gave significant advantages to the government and the ruling party. In 2001, British Columbia was the first to pass legislation to fix the date of provincial elections. Several other provinces followed suit. In 2007, a fixed date was set at the federal level. The article raises the question of whether the Canadian parliament has become a congress due to this innovation. Answering it in the negative, the author analyzes the provisions of laws and court decisions, as well as the practice of the institution of fixing the date of elections. The article draws a general conclusion that despite new trends in the development of the institution of parliamentary dissolution, the parliamentary system in the UK and Canada remains flexible: it gives the Prime Minister a choice of alternatives to conduct in the event of political disagreements. The author emphasizes that despite the innovations, parliamentarism in the UK and Canada retains its essential properties. 

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