Relations between legislatures and non-majority institutions as a subject of legislative studies
https://doi.org/10.31249/poln/2023.01.02
Abstract
This review highlights various aspects of the relationship between elected legislatures (that in the broad sense could be called the majoritarian institutions) and the non-majoritarian institutions (such as executive agencies, central banks, etc.). The topics covered include efficient delegation of authority from principal to agent, the correlates of such efficient delegation, as well as the tools that legislatures might use to maximize the utility they derive from such delegation. Based on the state-of-the-art literature on the topic of delegation from majoritarian to non-majoritarian institutions, we show that the main instruments of delegation include selection of an agent by the principal; the formal regulation of the agent’s activities by the principal; as well as using informal restrictions and threats to influence the agent’s activities. At the same time, the non-majoritarian institutions’ activities and strategies to expand their competences and increase their actual discretion remain poorly studied. An additional promising area of research is the non-majoritarian institutions’ positioning and strategizing under circumstances where the existent formal institutional structure cannot serve as a sufficient guarantee of their autonomy and independence. Placed in such dire conditions, they can be assumed to try and defend themselves against attacks by the legislatures and elected politicians, or at least to adapt their activities accordingly in anticipation of a possibility of such hostile behaviour.
About the Authors
I. Grigoriev
HSE University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
St. Petersburg
E. Rodionova
HSE University
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
St. Petersburg
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