КОНЦЕПЦИЯ ВЕТО-ИГРОКОВ: НОВЫЙ ПОДХОД В ИЗУЧЕНИИ ФОРМ ПРАВЛЕНИЯ
Аннотация
В статье представлены основные положения концепции вето-игроков, предложенной Дж. Цебелисом. Рассматриваются ключевые понятия, используемые в данной концепции, принципы и способы определения вето-игроков, результаты их взаимодействия и влияния на политическую систему. Кроме того, в статье проанализированы преимущества и недостатки концепции, перспективы ее дальнейшего применения для исследования российской политики.
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