Formal theory in institutional political science
Abstract
The article is focused on some methodological problems of modern formal political theory. We discuss reasons for and limits of game theory dominance in the field of institutional analysis. We propose a novel approach to understanding and measuring an institutional quality; it rests upon conceptual and formal design that differs strongly from game theoretic methodology. Our approach doesn’t link the quality of institutions with the incentivesof rational individualsto increase common good.Instead, we state that good institutions are those capable of increasing common goodwhen individual behavior deviates significantly from rational standard. We call such a capacity the institutional robustness. On the basis of this approach we develop and analyze a dynamical formal model.
About the Authors
A. . Akhremenko
Национальный исследовательский университет - Высшая школа экономики
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
A. . Mikhaylov
Институт прикладной математики им. М.В. Келдыша РАН
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
A. . Petrov
Институт прикладной математики им. М.В. Келдыша РАН
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
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