Presidentialism and responsibility attribution for economic hardships in Russia

Presidentialism is a specific type of political system, which entails the direct mandate for the head of state in policy development and implementation. Chief executive under presidentialism has an entire control over the government. The direct mandate also implies direct accountability: negative policy outcomes and consequences should affect the president’s rating and ultimately - electoral survival. Russian case defies this logic - despite the protracted economic downturn in 2010 s and perceived central role of the president in governing the country, Vladimir Putin maintained high approval rating and was successfully reelected in 2018. Using the models of responsibility attribution and focus-group discussions on the origins and consequences of economic crisis in Russia as an empirics, we argue that the lack of institutional clarity / institutional complexity explains this phenomenon. Divided political responsibility between the president and the parliament invokes the blame game between the branches of power ; as a result, the government and the State Duma act as «lighting rods» in Russian political system. Moreover, the transitional character of Russian economy with frequent downturns and drawbacks hinders the adequate evaluation of its state by the citizens and complicates further the responsibility attribution. This study helps to situate the economic voting and responsibility attribution models to the complex political contexts beyond established Western democracies and points to the importance of institutional complexities, which might help or hinder the citizens to hold governments accountable for the economic misfortunes.

президенциализм, атрибуция ответственности, экономический кризис, экономическое неблагополучие, политические институты, подотчетность, presidentialism, responsibility attribution, economic crisis, economic hardships, political institutions, accountability

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