Factors of mass support for government in the times of structural reforms

Any country in order to stay afloat sooner or later is forced to undertake large-scale internal reforms in various policy areas. However, structural reforms often bear adverse consequences for the population. As the studies of the US and European states show, one of the most crucial negative consequences is the decrease in mass support for the government that has initiated the reform. The latter manifests itself in a drop of approval ratings, trust in government, propensity to vote for the incumbent at the forthcoming elections. Such a decrease may lead to decreased legitimacy of the political power, thereby destabilizing the current political system. Is it possible to strike the balance between the necessity of reform and upholding trust on the society’s behalf? Can a government carry out painful reforms without provoking hatred? What conditions facilitate such balance? Although the factors of mass support play the central role in nowadays’ political science, the answers to the questions mentioned above remain unanswered. This article examines different options available to governments in order to preserve their mass support and legitimacy when conducting unpopular reforms, with a special emphasis on media framing. Using various theoretical sources and the recent literature on political support in Russia, it identifies various factors that may facilitate the use of the latter option in the Russian context.

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