Models of controlled transfer of presidential power

The transfer of presidential power in a democratic regime is carried out through the institutional mechanism of public competition in elections. In this case, the phenomenon of «democratic uncertainty» arises, since it is not known who will be the winner and take the office of president. Under a regime with a democratic deficit, the political leader and the ruling elite seek to ensure a controlled transfer of presidential power in order to maintain their dominant position in politics and the economy. The article analyzes the main models of controlled transfer of power of the head of state in presidential systems. First, the president can «transfer» power «by inheritance» to one of the closest relatives, thereby creating authoritarian political dynasties outside monarchies. Secondly, it is possible that the president, due to his old age or political considerations, leaves his post and moves to another government post in order to control the political situation. A reliable successor is selected for the presidency. Thirdly, the restriction on the replacement of the same person’s office as president and the reluctance to change the constitution lead to a rare scenario in which the president prepares a reliable and faithful successor to his office for one term, and after it expires, returns to the president’s office. Fourthly, the transfer of power to the successor can occur along with complete retirement of the outgoing president. At the same time, strong institutional guarantees are created for the outgoing president and members of his family. Finally, fifthly, the outgoing president may initiate a change of the form of government: presidential - to parliamentary or semi-presidential with a very weak president or parliamentary to a presidential system. The goal of this transition is to change the balance of power in favor of the strengthened prime minister or the strengthened president. The article also considers the institutional mechanisms that ensure a controlled transfer of presidential power: the constitutional change of the «second person» in the state; decreasing age or canceling the lower age threshold for a presidential candidate; the creation of new posts; Mexican practice «dedazo»; change of the form of government; institutional guarantees to the outgoing president.

президент, президентская система, авторитарный режим, авторитарный контроль, передача власти, преемничество, наследование, отставка президента, сроки полномочий президента, president, presidential system, authoritarian regime, authoritarian control, transfer of power, succession, inheritance, president's resignation, terms of office of president

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