The interaction of the president, government and parliament in semi-presidential systems: a comparative analysis of the experience of Russia, Ukraine and Turkey

The article discusses the main trends in the evolution of the interaction mechanisms of the president, government and parliament in semi-presidential systems. The political systems of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the Republic of Turkey are presented as comparative referees. The authors draw attention to the combination of internal and external factors of changes in these political systems that influence the nature of relations between the main institutions of state power. We used the methodology of index analysis of semi-presidential systems. An analysis of the data suggests that in the period under review only the Turkish system demonstrated a progressive concentration of power in the hands of the President within the «President - Parliament - Government» triangle. In the Turkish case, there is a transition from a parliamentary model with a «strong President» at the first stage to a full-fledged mixed form of government, the index of which is identical to the index of the prime-presidential model of Ukraine under the 2004 Constitution. At the second stage, the Turkish mixed form evolved towards strengthening presidentialization based on the results of the 2017 referendum. Ukraine has demonstrated the unstable dynamics of the evolution of relations between the President and the Prime Minister. The presidential-parliamentary version of the model established by the 1996 Constitution was abolished at the first stage as a result of the political agreement of V. Yanukovich and V. Yushchenko in 2004. This transition is characterized by parliamentarization and the strengthening of the Prime Minister within the framework of the Premier-Presidential system of interactions. At the next stage in 2010, there was a return to the constitutional model of 1996, expressed in the concentration of powers of the head of state and reverse presidentialization. At the third stage, as a result of the «revolution of dignity», the interaction between the President and the Prime Minister returned to the 2004 format. Analysis of the parameters of the Russian system within the framework of the index approach leads to the conclusion that there is no dynamics in the evolution of the form of government. The only adoption of the amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 2008 did not lead to a change in the foundations of the dualism of the executive (the amendments in principle do not have parameters analyzed by the index model).

полупрезидентские системы, авторитарные государства, президент, правительство, парламент, разделение властей, semi-presidential systems, authoritarian states, president, government, parliament, separation of powers

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