The article focuses on the development of memory studies as a research field. It is accepted to distinguish three waves in memory studies, the last of which, which began in the late 1990 s, continues to this day. As features of a research field we can identify such complex components as a level, a method, and an object of analysis, as well as an institutional structure capable of organizing this analysis, and criteria for evaluating results. The author analyzes these components, specifically focusing on the functioning of the very concept of memory, the possibility of applying methods of natural sciences to its study, as well as the level of institutional development of memory studies. Founding of a specialized magazine (2008) and an association (2016), as well as the popularity of educational programs on the subject of memory can be regarded as evidence of overcoming the crisis diagnosed in the field in late 1990 s.

This article provides a historiography review of heritage studies, as well as examples of case studies and methods that are equally relevant for the study of heritage and politics of memory. The founding works of the Heritage Studies discipline insisted that the past is a construct universally used for ideological and commercial purposes. Following this methodological principle, contributions of recent years have significantly expanded conceptual framework of the discipline. The region of Eastern Europe is of interest for studies at the intersection of heritage and memory politics as the area with a high concentration of competing narratives. However, as one may observe in publications of recent years, offering a general framework for developments with heritage matters in the region remains to be a challenging task.

The article is a part of the study devoted to framing of memory about the 1990 s and the 2000 s in the Russian political discourse. It presents the results of analysis of representations of the 1990 s in Vladimir Putin’s speeches and interviews from January, 2004 to May, 2008. The author reveals four methods of framing the experience of the 1990 s: 1) explicit criticism of the policy of the 1990 s and its results; 2) constructing recognizable verbal signs; 3) using populist rhetoric that combines demonstration of care about people’s needs with criticism of «the other» politicians; 4) telling narratives that implicitly shaped connections between events by the selection of episodes and roles assigned to actors. By representing his policy in contrast to the previous experience, Putin contributed to constructing the myth about «the hard nineties» .

The article is about today’s reflection of intellectuals representing the Russian Orthodox Church’s on anniversary of reformatory General Council activity in 1917-1918 and the so called «Сhurch revolution of 1917» versus Church official discourse. Intellectuals use the politics of memory to criticize nowadays Church and highlight the Legitimacy of Council’s decisions based on the principle of election and involvement of society in church’s life. The main idea of Church officials commemoration is to underline the only one decision of Council - rehabilitation of Patriarch without respect to democratic election procedures and priority of democratic elected Council over personal power.

The article attempts to analyze the participation of The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the formation and implementation of the state politics of memory in modern Russia. The main attention is paid to the institutional aspect of interaction between the ROC and the State. The author sets the task of revealing the influence of the Church on the Russian politics of memory and describing the mechanisms of its realization in the context of interaction of religious and state institutions. Historical politics is seen as an integral part of politics of memory. The article analyzes the public strategies of the ROC in relation to the past as part of the process of political socialization in cooperation with the state educational system and the armed forces. The author also analyzes the process of formation of the symbolic space of Russia by state institutions and the possibility of participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in this process. It is concluded that the Church and the state form complementary (not adversarial) channels of socialization in the implementation of the state policy of memory.

In the article, based on published sources and field materials of the author, considered several problems of the place of the Caucasian War in the historical memory of Circassians on the backdrop of the localization this event in the large narrative of the Russian Federation. In the USSR since the 1950-s the theme of the Caucasian war is on the sidelines of both scientific study and public attention. The historical content of the longest conflict in Russian history clearly contradicted the party-ideological tasks of ensuring international peace and harmony. The tradition of forgetfulness of the Caucasian war has remained actual and in the politics of the memory of modern Russia. At the same time, for the Circassians, the Caucasian War is the most important place of memory, the core of historical self-awareness. In Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Adygea, the most large-scale phenomenon of commemoration in the post-Soviet period was the Day of Remembrance of Adygs - victims of the Caucasian War (May 21). Attempts its recognition at the federal level have been unsuccessful. This was the reason for the formation of a memorial gap between the Adygeyan ethnic group and the big Russian society.

After the collapse of the USSR, the process of formation a number of conservative and right-wing ideologies began. All of them borrowed plots from historical science to legitimize them. New political mythologies were being formed. Baron Roman Ungern von Sternberg (1886-1921) became a key figure of this mythmaking. For this period, the attempts to construct ideologies both of the Eurasian and the extreme right orientation were undertaken around him and his ideas. Political leaders of the very different directions often appeal to myths on Baron Ungern. This myth in the political memory of the contemporary Russia is created by professional scientists - historians, publicists as well as by experts in esotericism and mystics. The main objective of this article is to consider a mechanism of formation the image of a «new hero of Eurasia» on the example of creating Baron Ungern’s canonical life profile.

The center orientation and closed character of the Soviet space turned borderline areas into half-empty places remaining in absolute readiness for confrontation. According to the Soviet outlook on the world borders were viewed as a source of danger and an area of confrontation with the enemies. The paper analyses late Soviet discursive practices concerning the danger of fictional Cossack communities in Mongolia, China, and Transbaikalia with their old-fashioned life style and strong anti-Soviet attitudes and their influence for modern process of reconciliation (after Civil War) in Eastern Siberia. Originating form J. Scott’s and G. Agamben’s ideas concerning the performative power of state description using categories of exclusion the author will attempt to avoid straightforward early-socialist martyrization to show symbolic aspects of exclusion and the specificity of political demonology of the post-Stalinist USSR.J. Scott’s attitude towards the key role of state description in the development of borderline political banditry and the possibility to usurp the field of official ideology and adapt it for a group’s own needs described by G.-E. Debord will constitute the theoretical basis for the paper.

In the 2000 s European integration became a key declared geopolitical goal in Ukraine and Moldova. Rapprochement with the EU presupposes not only the implementation of political and economic reforms, but also the conformity with “European” values.” Conformity with European memory politics is among such values. Yet, there are two conflicting trends within European memory politics. The first trend focuses on the creation of the pillars of the all-European historical narrative and the Holocaust commemoration, which presupposes the responsibility of all Europeans for this tragedy. The second approach, which formed recently, entails the condemnation of totalitarian regimes, and boils down to the sufferings of one’s own people. In the process of European integration Ukrainian and Moldovan politicians encountered the possibility to exploit the first trend and roughly after 2009 both of them. The paper compares the role of these two tendencies of European memory politics in state history politics in Ukraine and Moldova. The existence of two conflicting approaches of European memory politics created wiggle room for the governments, which declared European integration their goal. In general, European memory politics became the source of legitimacy for political regimes in Ukraine and Moldova and at the same time a weapon in the internal political struggle. Ukrainian and Moldovan governments have used the ritualistic commemoration of Holocaust to cover up the failures of their political and economic reforms. At the same time, in the context of the ambiguous perception of the Soviet past in Ukraine and Moldova the European condemnation of totalitarian regimes became a tool of internal political battles. The scope and scale of the anti-Communist campaigns were different. Yet, in both cases the European decisions serve as one of the grounds for the legitimation of “memory wars.” Instead of becoming a uniting force, as it was originally conceived, European memory politics frequently turned out to be one of the factors, stimulating internal conflict in Ukraine and Moldova.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the decommunization process in post-Soviet Ukraine. The author explores the main stages decommunisation, attitude to this process authorities and society. In this study, several basic models were identified according to which the names were changed. An important role in this process was played by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, which became the initiator of so-called «memorial laws» and their subsequent implementation. The coexistence in the public spaces of the Soviet symbolic heritage and the symbols of independent Ukraine ended in the overflowing of Soviet symbols with a new meaning. Soviet symbols were labeled as a form of Russia's presence as an enemy within the country. Thus, after 2013 the Soviet past was threatened with destruction, symbolic nationalization, or commemoration as a «totalitarian art».

The article highlights the features and national varieties of memory politics about Yugoslavia and bounded past events in post-Yugoslav states. The traits of «positive» and «negative Yugoslavism», Yugo-nostalgia and Titostalgia are analysed as well as difference between political actors addressing to them in their rhetoric. The scopes and configurations of memory politics about Yugoslavia in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are revealed. The article shows the influence of different conditions on the content and extension of «positive» and «negative Yugoslavism».

Considering historical memory as a discursive phenomenon, the author studies the place of the «historical argument» in that semiotic space that is formed around the activities of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main thesis is that the referring to the past provides a moral justification for the foreign policy pursued, but because of domination of the ethics of virtue, not of universal principles, activities in the field are focused on emphasizing the role of Russia and its achievements. The main attention is paid to the struggle against Nazism during the WWII, less afford are oriented on creating the image of savior (for example, the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78 for the liberation of Bulgarian people) or the responsible member of military alliances in different historical periods (Napoleonic wars, World War I).

The First World War created a wave of nation-state building and gave a new impulse to the democratization process. The article shows how such social and political transformations have been are reflected in the memorials of the post-war period, representing people’s recollections of the events of the era. From the artistic perspective, gradual diversion from the imperial tradition and more national symbols in the design of the monuments demonstrate the intensification of nation-state building, while reference to the heroism of common people and to the attributes of peace represent yet another wave of democratization. The article stresses the importance of memorials in visualizing collective memory.