The classic model of parliamentarism, the main components of which are the supremacy of parliament, popular representation, the role of parliament as a public platform for political discussion and the control of the executive branch by parliament, is undergoing changes in the context of the newest challenges of the 21 st century. The author lists such challenges as the requirement for greater transparency of parliament, digitalization and professionalization of parliamentary activities. The article analyzes in detail these challenges and the responses of parliaments to them. The author concludes that today the world's parliaments are modernizing their structure, activities and functions. The classic model of parliamentarism is being modified, its traditional components are being weakened. Firstly, the prevalence of electronic forms of citizen participation in the activities of the legislature calls into question the principle of the supremacy of parliament. Secondly, the mechanism of representativeness, based on the connections of deputies with their voters in traditional forms, is gradually weakening, since direct forms of electronic democracy are actively used. Thirdly, the role of parliament as a public platform for political discussion is being eroded due to the development of the Internet and social networks, as well as new electronic forms of conveying the will of voters to deputies. Fourthly, the role of the opposition in parliament is somewhat reduced since its functions of criticism and control over the government are “intercepted” by citizens on social networks and in the implementation of various forms of electronic participation. Finally, the nature of communication between deputies and voters is changing, as interaction through digital platforms is being introduced. The conclusions the author has drawn are preliminary in nature and have no claim to universality but record only the latest trends in changing the model of parliamentarism in the contemporary world.

Power-sharing is a political institutional arrangement in which the joint participation of the representatives of different political segments of society in government is consistently reproduced. Although the idea of power-sharing was initially associated with the concept of consociational democracy, over time it has expanded beyond the consociational approach. The article is devoted to a comparative overview of empirical cases of power-sharing in presidential and parliamentary systems of government. Classifying power-sharing according to two criteria (type of parties and assignment of government positions to ethnic segments), four models can be distinguished. In parliamentary systems, the model closest to corporate consociationalism, when government positions are assigned to certain ethno-political segments through their parties, is more common. In presidential systems, on the contrary, a centripetal approach to power-sharing prevails; here, access of segments to power is ensured through interethnic parties without a strict assignment of government positions. These dependencies, however, are by no means rigid, since in all institutional models of power-sharing, countries with both parliamentary and presidential systems are found. As for the specific mechanisms of power-sharing implementation, there are no significant differences between parliamentary and presidential systems, with the exception of those mechanisms that arise from the fundamental differences between them. In terms of long-term managing ethnic heterogeneity, only less than half of the cases of power-sharing examined demonstrate effectiveness, and this does not depend on either the system of government or the institutional models of power-sharing.

Parliament is a place where competing narratives are voiced. This institution serves as a platform in the struggle to shape the political agenda and allocate public resources. The narratives at play include a plot, characters, references to current events and a moral of the story that points to a solution to a problem. The way they are framed and presented can influence the setting of political priorities, the allocation of responsibilities and the formulation of solutions. By examining their use in parliamentary debates, we can reveal how consensus is built or destroyed among parliamentarians, and how discursive monopolies that set the tone for the very format of discussion of actions or events are formed. This article examines approaches to the narrative analysis of the parliamentary process, explains the functions of political narratives in parliamentary debates, describes their significance for the formation of the political agenda, and highlights the main narrative strategies used in parliamentary debates.
Based on existing studies presented in foreign and Russian literature, this paper points out that the study of narratives used in parliamentary processes offers a functional framework for analyzing the polarization and politicization of issues on the agenda. It could help to identify established discursive monopolies and strategies of interaction between parliamentarians and different audiences on different categories of issues. By emphasizing the discursive nature of agenda-setting and meaning-making, as well as the role of narrative in parliamentary debates, an attempt is made to identify those basic narrative elements and strategies that can serve as a basis for creating tools to assess the quality of parliamentary processes and models of discursive intraparliamentary interactions.

The article provides a comparative analysis of supra-parliamentary institutions in the states of Post-Soviet Eurasia (Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus). As a theoretical basis for the analysis, the concept of re-traditionalization of the political process is proposed, the study of which is based, in its turn, on the concept of a non-Western political process (L. Pye), the theory of plebiscite democracy (M. Weber) and the concept of conciliar representation (V. Sergeev, N. Biryukov). “Conciliarity” (“sobornost”) is understood as ensuring people’s representation for the approval of decisions already taken and their legitimization through broad popular representation without differentiation according to the party-political principle. It is shown that the supra-parliamentary bodies of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus have characteristic features of “conciliar” bodies.
The paper analyzes the genesis and transformation of supra-parliamentary bodies, their constitutional powers, current and potential role in the political process, and effectiveness criteria. The analysis methodology provides the identification of two categories of powers of supra-parliamentary bodies and their subsequent operationalization for the purpose of comparative study: formal status and powers; actual powers and role in the political process.
It is shown that the status of the supra-parliamentary bodies of Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus has undergone a transformation from public assemblies to constitutional authorities, which have broad formal powers and play a significant role in the political process. As a result of the reform of the status of these bodies in 2021– 2023, they became the highest organs of people’s representation (plebiscite democracy) with broad powers. Their powers were enlarged at the cost of reducing the president’s powers. At the same time, there has been an actual strengthening of the role and influence of heads of state, even with a formal reduction in presidential powers due to the expansion of the powers of supra-parliamentary bodies in which the current or expresident plays a key role. This seems especially important in the context of presidential power transfer that has taken place (in Turkmenistan) or is expected (in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan). From this point of view, the criterion for the effectiveness of supraparliamentary bodies is the legitimization of presidential power and the ability to ensure stability in the conditions of power transfer to the new president.

The topic of the article is relevant due to the fact that informal institutions play an important role in the functioning of political systems. The crisis of political parties, manifested in all Western countries, is especially pronounced in contemporary Spain. The purpose of the article is to find out the informal interactions of Spanish political parties using the example of inter-party negotiations on the formation of a government in 2023. The methodological basis of the work is historical neo-institutionalism. The empirical basis of the research comprises the speeches of political figures, the results of opinion polls and parliamentary elections, articles in periodicals (newspapers «El Pais», «La Vanguardia» and «OKDiario»). The influence of the parameters of institutional design (proportional electoral system with a low barrier and high regionalization of the party system) on the use of informal institutions in Spain is revealed. Spanish political parties use informal interaction practices when forming a government: negotiations, exchange of resources (support for the election of candidates in exchange for recognition of the status of regional languages), draft cooperation agreements, promises of amnesty and a referendum, resignations and expulsions from the parties of dissatisfied. When forming the government, the separation of «Unitarians – separatists» was more important than the line «left – right». The development of shadow negotiations depended on the outcome of the vote on candidates for the post of Prime Minister – A. Nuñes Feijoo (People’s Party) and P. Sanchez Perez-Castejon (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party). The victory of the Socialist candidate confirmed the growing role of regional parties and the problems of center-peripheral relations in the formation of the Spanish government. At the same time, it will not be easy for the government to implement the conditions for the election of P. Sanchez – an amnesty for the leaders of the Catalan secessionists and a referendum on the political status of Catalonia and will require a new round of shadow negotiations between the parties.

The article examines the evolution of the Turkish form of government as a unique case of rapid presidentialization, reflected both in the practical content of the relationship between the branches of government and the constitutional rules of the game in the triangle «President – Parliament – government». The specifics of the process of presidentialization are investigated within the framework of a neoinstitutional approach. The constitutional and legal aspects of the relationship between the branches of government, historical determinants, the specifics of the party system and the interaction of the head of state and the government, and external influence are analyzed. The «path of dependence» of the Turkish system is represented by the historical competition of projects for the personification of power, parliamentarism and military rule. At the beginning of the XXI century, the period of fragmentation of the party system of the 1990 s was replaced by the dominance of the Justice and Development Party of R.T. Erdogan in the legislature, which laid the foundation for personification. After the consolidation of state bodies under the control of the AKP, there was a consistent decrease in the autonomy of prime ministers. In the constitutional dimension, there has been a transformation of the institutional design from a parliamentary republic to a presidentialized system with the monism of the executive branch and the establishment of the interdependence of the political destinies of the president and parliament. One of the conditions for the success of the transit was the elimination of the political role and autonomy of military institutions, which for almost 100 years acted as a controller of social development. By the 2020 s, the answer to the concentration of power resources in the hands of R.T. Erdogan's goal was to consolidate and increase the representation of the parliamentary opposition in the VNST, which, combined with the inertia of the army's view of its own political role, creates the likelihood of a revision of the form of government. The main factors of the stability of the presidentialized form of government will be the ability to overcome the manifestations of the socio-economic crisis, the historical inertia of the political role of the army, and the crisis of leadership during the transit of presidential power. The study of the factors of presidentialization identified in the framework of the study can be used in analyzing the evolution of semi-presidential republics, including the post-Soviet space.

The article defines the political nature of the processes of changing the parliamentary procedure for making legislative decisions in the context of modern trends in institution-building. Using the example of amendments to the Regulations of the State Duma of the Russian Federation of the VII–VIII convocations, the peculiarities of using the procedure as a tool for transforming the political statuses of participants in the legislative process, expressed in strengthening the discipline of deputies, expanding the possibilities of monitoring their activities by factions and the leadership of the Chamber, increasing the powers of the Chairman and the Council of the Duma, are studied. As a result, the leadership of the lower house strengthened control not only over «ordinary» deputies, but also over extra-parliamentary structures (within the framework of parliamentary control) and the legislative process as a whole. Separately, the growth of the political weight of the commissions and their chairmen in the VIII convocation is noted.
The article notes the trends of changing the logic of institutional transformations in Russia, characterized by the desire of individual political actors not so much to influence the results of the legislative process as to control the internal processes of parliamentary activity, building a kind of «intra-parliamentary vertical of power». Special attention in the study is paid to the relationship between formal procedures and informal practices: depending on the «type» of parliamentary activity and the interests of participants in the process, some established practices may acquire the status of a formally fixed rule, while others may be excluded from political practice. The definition of political implications in changing the procedure of work of legislative authorities offers researchers a new look at the trends of institutional transformations and institution-building in modern Russia.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the role of parliamentary experience in the previous career of the Russian Federation government members. The empirical basis of the study is a biographical database that includes questionnaires for 136 persons who were members of the Russian government in 2000–2021. The author concludes that the Federal Assembly is a secondary channel of recruitment of the government elite, which mainly comes from administrative bodies and often has experience in business. This is not surprising, since parliament is controlled by the head of state and has little influence on the formation of the government. However, the prevalence of parliamentary experience varies in different governments: it is relatively common in the cabinet of M.M. Kasyanov, the second government of V.V. Putin and the first government of D.A. Medvedev, while it is absent among members of the current cabinet M.V. Mishustin. Members of the government with legislative experience usually served in senior positions in the legislature: vice-speakers, chairmen of committees and leaders of factions. The prevalence of parliamentary experience also varies depending on the type of government position: deputy prime ministers are more likely to come from the legislature than economic and power ministers. For deputy prime ministers, experience in senior positions in parliament and parties is more important due to the specifics of their functions in government and their role in intra-elite networks and interactions.

In this paper, we trained our machine learning and neural network models to predict the outcome of the bills’ consideration in the Russian State Duma. We used data collected from October 24, 1994 to December 1, 2022. A rubert-tiny model was used for data preprocessing, a random forest classifier, logistic regression and a neural network model of 3 linear layers were used for prediction. The models demonstrated qualitative results on real-life data: 94% accuracy was achieved by using attached documents’ texts as the models’ parameters and 87% accuracy by training on the data from the bill’s passport. Based on the text of the draft alone, the model’s accuracy accounted for 75.6%. The most important factor influencing the prediction result was the text of the Governmental conclusion. The second most important parameter influencing the results was the “Subject of the right of legislative initiative” with 31.5% of significance in the models’ prediction. Random forest algorithm performed best when working with combined text data and bill passport parameters while logistic regression and neural network showed promising results based on textual parameters alone. The probability of bill’s adoption was not significantly influenced by the financial justification text, the explanatory note text or the subject matter of the bill. The author draws conclusions about the practical applications of the trained models, as well as identifies further scientific problems in the field of mathematical analysis and prediction of lawmaking.

The article examines the forming procedure of the Swiss government in order to identify mechanisms for the distribution of political influence in conditions of heterogeneity of the parliamentary coalition. Successful operation of the Swiss semiparliamentary system is maintained due to the consensual model of democracy based on the principle of power-sharing. The analysis of the Swiss parliamentary system outlines the main stages of power-sharing implementation for the distribution of power between the constitutional parties in parliament and in government. The main forms of manifestation of power sharing include the federal structure, the institution of referendums, the proportional electoral system and the «grand coalition» in parliament. These elements ensure stability of the Swiss political process, which participants differ in language, social status and ideology. Particular attention is focused on the “Magic Formula” – the way of formation and function of the Swiss government (Federal Council). The “Magic formula”, based on the principle of power sharing, ensures proportional representation of the main political parties, linguistic groups and the most populous cantons in the Federal Council. Due to the “Magic formula”, the Swiss government makes decisions based on the principle of consensus, despite the fact that the ministers belong different parties. The “Magic Formula's” resistance to external and internal challenges characterized through the research of the recent changes in the Swiss parliamentary system, such as the rise and radicalization of the Swiss People's Party, the emergence of new parliamentary parties and the general polarization of parliamentary factions. Basing on the analysis of the recent Swiss elections, the prospects for further adjustment of the Magic Formula and its place in the Swiss political system are assessed.

Emerged in the 1980 s as a type of «niche» party, the Greens have now become significant political players in Western and Northern Europe. They are increasing their representation in national parliaments and quite often participate in coalition governments. To increase their chances of entering government, they have an incentive to broaden their political agenda to attract new voters. This article asks how the program transformation of the Greens affects their participation in government coalitions in Western and Northern European countries. The study is based on the Manifesto Project Main Dataset and is conducted by logistic regression analysis. Along with the transformation of the Greens' programs, the following factors derived from the classical theories of government coalition formation are tested: the political weight of the party in the national parliament and the ideological proximity of coalition partners. By confirming the significance of these factors, the study allows us to conclude that the expansion of the Greens' political agenda, i.e. the reduction of the share of environmental issues in the electoral program compared to the previous electoral cycle, increases their chances of being included in the government coalition. Thus, the Greens demonstrate pragmatism by adapting to the political agenda of potential coalition partners.