The article examines changes in the Russian memory politics at the turn of the 2010s-2020s, the balance of influence of mnemonic actors, external conditions and internal modalities of the struggle for the political use of the historical past. Growing tensions and conflict potential in Russia’s relations with the collective West have now escalated into a multifactorial confrontation in which the collective identity of Russians, the key elements of the historical narrative and collective memory answering the basic questions of identity politics – who we are, where we come from and where we are going to – are being decisively challenged. The author shows that securitization is becoming the dominant trend in the politics of memory, but at the same time, the historical narrative supported by the state is far from being fully completed. The information-psychological and mnemonic struggle both in the international arena and within the country encourages the federal government to focus primarily on the causes and results of the Second World War, the circumstances of the USSR's entry into it, its decisive role in the victory over fascism, as well as the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations. Meanwhile, the securitization of the official historical narrative includes legislative work, e.g. amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the adoption of «memorial» laws, the tightening and expansion of the scope of legislation on «oreign agents», as well as law enforcement practice, the result of which is a change in the mnemonic actors’ configuration and balance of power. The second part of the article deals with the problems of the political use of the past in the context of the Special military operation, including the memory politics in the regions incorporated into Russian Federation based on amendments to the Constitution adopted on October 4, 2022.

   The article examines speeches and articles of Vladimir Putin on history and past as political communicative acts. It begins with analysis of Putin’s visit to Poland in 2009, when he published a special article about history for the first time. It can be characterized as agonistic, oriented towards mutually respectful dialog. Every Putin’s address about past and memory in 2019–2021 had several addressees and contained important political messages. In 2019–2020 Putin tried to prevent the ongoing revision of «the Nuremberg narrative» of the WWII. He proposed dialog with the leading Western countries. He also suggested a meeting of the leaders of the UN Security Council permanent members to discuss this issue. At this time, we see an attempt to follow agonistic approach in relations with the countries of the «old» West, and highly confrontational approach towards Poland and Baltic states. The 2021 article about Ukrainian issues contains the most complete justification of irredentist approach in Russian foreign policy. It is dominated by confrontational approach to the West. To talk more precisely, Putin then addresses only the USA, and he will do it again half a year later when he would demand written guaranties on Ukraine from Washington. Agonistic approach disappears, while the antagonistic one dominates over the messages.

   The article is devoted to the evolution of the policy of memory of Nazi crimes in modern Russia. The general trend of differentiation and deepening of ideas about these events in the 1990s–2010s has sharply changed in the early 2020s in the form of the assertion of the «genocide of the Soviet people» thesis. Since the 2000s, external challenges had a serious impact on the political use of Nazi crimes: attempts to fit into the emerging «pan-European» culture of memory, «wars of memory» with the Baltic states and Ukraine (since the mid-2000s), actualization of history in relations with Israel, the conflict with Ukraine (since 2014). All of this eventually led to the affirmation of a progressive (heroic) approach with a focus on the liberating role of the Red Army and the participation of Soviet citizens in the resistance against Nazi extermination policy. In part, this coincided with the establishment of institutions of historical politics in Russia and the strengthening of the significance of the memory of the Great Patriotic War as a «civil religion». For the official politics, the memory of Nazi crimes remains rather in a vivid way, emphasizing both the brutality of the enemy and the sanctity of the feat of the Soviet soldier, rather than an independent object of commemoration, allowing a discussion of the causes of such violence, questions of guilt, complicity and responsibility. However, this does not preclude the gradual development of memory infrastructure of Nazi crimes, the increase in the number of memory actors engaged, in working with it, as well as the inclusion of this topic in regional historical narratives.

   The article is devoted to the transforming practices of the movement “Immortal Regiment” and its semantic interpretation on the eve, during the period, and the first year after the coronavirus pandemic.

   The key object of analysis is the state organization «Immortal Regiment of Russia».

   Tracing the logic of memory digitalization in Russian historical politics, as well as grassroots audience commemorative requests, the author points to key changes in ways of interpreting the practice in Russia after the resolution of the European Parliament on the “Importance of European Remembrance for the Future of Europe” (2019) that approved the concept of “two totalitarianisms”. The processes of expanding the concepts of kinship, heroism and chronological boundaries of memory, visual solutions, as well as the semantic subordination of practice to the needs of Russian historical politics have led to blurring of the concept “Immortal Regiment”. In the new configuration the “Immortal Regiment” has become an umbrella concept that incorporates mass of practices of remembering the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. In addition, it has taken shape as an image of a national heritage that affirms the inviolability of Russian patriotism, heroism, sacrifice and their intergenerational continuity. Moreover, the new idea of «Immortal Regiment of Russia» blurred the heroic narrative to the limit, uniting the military feat of all generations, including the current one. By 2022, the politicization of the initially civil independent movement has reached its semantic, practical, and rhetorical apogee.

   The article studies the political usage of national holidays contributing to the promotion of traditional values in modern Russia. The article demonstrates that the ideological component of the national holidays “invented” in last 10 years took shape affected with cultural and value confrontation and «conservative turn». Traditional family becomes the main moral reference point. The article discusses the features of the symbolic use and institutionalization of the Family, Love and Fidelity Day, Mother's Day and Father's Day. The Day of Christening of Russia (memorable date), the Day of Slavic culture and writing commemorate and reflect a special cultural tradition and contribute to the Russian «cultural code». At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church becomes the main ally of the ruling elite in protecting values and spiritual and moral education of youth, by offering its own socio-political doctrine.

   The article presents the results of a comprehensive analysis of such a significant element of the collective consciousness of Russian youth as political identity. The authors share the conventional understanding of political identity as attributing oneself to certain political views, parties, politicians and public opinion leaders, as well as certain ideological values. The article leverages the data from online survey of Russian youth and expert survey of scientists, political authorities, and political youth activists and leaders conducted in October–November 2022. The mass online survey was accomplished in the online questionnaire mode, while conducting an expert survey, the method of non-standardized interview was applied to collect information, as well as the method of discourse analysis was used for processing. The study reflected the persistence of a significant group of young people with an unformed set of political identity, as well as the inhomogeneity of indicators of political identity in different age subgroups of generations z and y. In modern conditions, political parties as identification objects are unattractive to young people by contrast with bloggers and public opinion leaders. Russian youths party identity rates are significantly lower than ones of political attitudes and orientations. The demand of young people for the value of justice, which is combined in their minds with the values of freedom and human rights, remains extremely high. The results of the study indicate a deficit of political socialization institutions in the process of forming the political identity of the Russian youth.

   The article examines the value preferences of today's Russian youth basing on the generalization of expert interviews. The empirical basis for the survey is based on 15 expert interviews. The sample of respondents included university teachers, specialists in youth management, journalists of youth media, entrepreneurs targeting their business to young people, PR-specialists, employees of military history museums, etc. The sample was formed using a combination of the "snowball" method and the use of databases with the personalities of the most cited specialists. Expert interviews were conducted in the period from September 15 to October 30, 2022. Basing on the generalization of the data obtained, the author concludes that young people deny the intrinsic value of labor being oriented towards quick success (understood as a combination of material well-being, financial independence and freedom in terms of leisure activities). Experts also note the high importance of freedom and interactivity of communication for young people in the discussion of the socio-political agenda, and the lack of unity in the perception of symbols and values traditionally associated with the images of heroes. The latter is most clearly manifested in the case of patriotism, which is strongly associated with military discourse only among the traditionalist part of young Russians. In general, experts interpret the value preferences of young people based on an idealistic paradigm. A logical consequence of this is the recognition of the fundamental possibility of transforming the value preferences of young people without carrying out large-scale reforms in the field of the economy, spatial development policy, and social and educational policy strategies. In accordance with the assessments expressed by experts, the value preferences of young people can be optimized by reforming the structure, nomenclature, and semantic content of the symbols broadcasted by mass culture that define ideas of approved and condemned models of thinking and behavior. At the same time, several expert assessments regarding the orientation towards prestigious consumption and quick success attributed to young people can be called into question based on the data of mass surveys. Experts also note the presence of excessive authoritarianism and defects in feedback mechanisms functioning in the framework of the state's attempts to form the values of the younger generation.

   The images of heroes in the minds of Russian youth are largely represented on the basis of products of mass culture (movies, books, music, computer games, etc.) perception. The article represents the results of a study, on the basis of which it is possible to reconstruct this space of heroes and correlate it with ideas about the real socio-political process. The conclusion is made about the predominance of movies and TV series as a type of leisure practice for young people. The choice of foreign films is made more often than domestic ones. Moreover, Soviet and some Russian movies produce more vivid images marked by young people than foreign ones. Russian youth uses the «hero of time» category, and with its help evaluates not only the layer of mass culture, but also the modern political process, highlighting its key figures. In this sense figures of Russian politicians from both the power and opposition spectrum come to the fore. Many respondents consider their parents to be heroes. Opinion leaders that work in social networks (bloggers, well-known media people) are considered to be the main factors that determine the preferences of young people in choosing certain works of mass culture. Their assessments appear to be more significant in comparison with the position of parents, teachers and special literature.

   There are more than two hundred analytical centers in the five EAEU countries that have formed a certain practice of participation in the socio-political life of the respective countries throughout the post-Soviet history. This practice has not yet been properly, studied in practical, terms, in terms of its real impact on the public policy formation and political decision-making. The article proposes to use / apply the existing theoretical developments regarding the activities of analytical centers, their results («ideas»), principles of interaction between themselves, as well as with state and public institutions («knowledge regimes», «model of stability and sustainability of state systems») to form a theoretical framework for assessing their role and functions in socio-political processes. As a result, an understanding of analytical centers as producers of «ideas» as well as the types of ideas and formats of their influence on socio-political processes, the functions of analytical centers in the context of ensuring stability and sustainability of state systems, ensuring public consent, and trust in state and public institutions was formed. The developed approach was tested as part of a study of the public activity of the EAEU think tanks in 2022 using quantitative and qualitative methods. The understanding of the dominant types of ideas produced by the analytical centers of the EAEU countries, of the main functions performed within the framework of ensuring the stability and sustainability of state systems, and of the «knowledge regimes» common among the EAEU countries was formed. The results obtained can be used to improve the activities of analytical centers both at the macro (the level of public policy) and at the micro (the level of a specific organization) levels.

   The article presents part of the pilot study results that solve the issue of identifying key images, values and symbols forming the Slavic identity of the youth in Russia and Eastern European countries. It depends on how meanings and values that have different levels and orientations – «universal», «pan-European», or «national» –– coexist (or conflict with one another) in a particular society. Slavs are one of the largest ethnolinguistic communities in Europe, and they have rich ancient history of interaction with one another and with other peoples. The article reflects the debatable nature of the question of the proper way to investigate Slavic identity. In addition to the theoretical part of the study, the authors conducted formalized interviews with the youth of Serbia and Bulgaria, aimed at identifying the value-semantic structure of the «Slavic identity» concept and the system of national and European values, political, ideological and identification orientations.

   The object of the study comprises the youth of the two countries, who in their daily experience constantly face particular images and symbols, ultimately affecting their self-identification.

   As a hypothesis, the following thesis is put forward: among the youth of these countries, two levels of values often coexist, «European» and «national», in this case, «Slavic». The pilot study reveals that without the reinforcement of «pragmatic» and understandable social and economic preferences, the Slavic idea is not relevant and is not comprehensible for young people, remaining a cultural phenomenon, although not devoid of political potential in the future.

   The article is devoted to the analysis of the results of a political and psychological study of the perception of Russian citizens of their country, conducted in the fall of 2022. The empirical basis of the study was obtained using qualitative methods: in-depth formalized interviews, incomplete sentences, projective drawing techniques. The article concludes that the image of the future of Russia is becoming clearer in the views of Russians, compared to the results obtained in previous studies, but some respondents also retain a feeling of uncertainty. Two scenarios of the country's development are revealed, positive and negative one, each of which is conditioned in the respondents' views by the events of the past, with which their consciousness draws logical analogies. The study showed that there is some consensus in the views and opinions of citizens regarding their country since the current event context stimulates less controversial assessments of historical events. The events currently taking place are interpreted by the mass consciousness as a repetition of the events of the past and allow to structure the historical memory of various strata of Russian society in a system of opposite evaluations (good-bad), leveling out the ambiguity (and at the same time irrelevance). History during periods of turbulence is perceived not only as «some-thing of the past», but also as «something that is happening now» and as «something that will be repeated in the future». The study reveals a trend of political perception demonstrating the connection between images of the past and images of the future, which we call the mechanism of the «Renaissance» construction of the image of the future, within which the perception of time by citizens acquires special features. It is suggested that the mechanism of the «Renaissance» construction of the future allows the consciousness of the respondents to get messianic ideas from the past, in the absence of unique messianic ideas in the modern communicative space, and to determine some universal, understandable guidelines for everyone to strive for now and in the future, both personally and collectively. The revealed polarity in citizens' assessments of the past, present and future of Russia, as well as the segmentation of these assessments, are determined by subjective factors of political perception: the influence of generational features of the perceiver's worldview, the individual and group social experience they have acquired.

   Ideological transformations of the ruling elites in post-Soviet Russia have placed traditional values in the mainstream of political discourse. Over time, the ideologeme of traditional values increasingly infiltrated into the official discourse and legislation, which was characterized as a «conservative turn» by some researchers. Existing works, primarily focusing on explaining the ideological potential of traditional values, do not pay enough attention to another process – the positioning of the same values as a component of Russian security. This article attempts to explain the connection between traditional values and security using discourse analysis within the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen School of securitization. Focusing on the speech act as the initial stage of securitization, the political discourse of the President of Russia from 2012 to 2022 is analyzed. Basing on these materials, the author identifies consistent patterns in the meaning of traditional values and the semantic classification of threats to these values. In addition, arguments linking traditional values to national security are illustrated. Traditional values are perceived as a tool for uniting Russian society, with a special emphasis on family models, special morality, and intergenerational continuity. At the same time, the value dictate of the collective West is mainly perceived as a threat to traditional values, which, as it is argued, can lead to the loss of sovereignty, demographic crisis, and the erosion of the Russian identity. This work also takes the first steps towards the understanding of the emerging rhetorical and political trends in Russia after 2022 and provides a basis for further research of traditional values with the Copenhagen School approach.

   The article is devoted to the study of features of anti-Western ideologies in the context of the crisis of the liberal order. It provides a comparative analysis of the ideas of the leading ideologists of Neo-Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism – Alexander Dugin and Ahmet Davutoğlu. As a response to the quest for new identities and status of Russia and Turkey in the new world order, Neo-Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism appeared after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. Both Dugin and Davutoğlu developed their own concepts of geopolitics, identity and foreign policy as an alternative to the Western ones. Using the method of discourse analysis and examining the works of Dugin and Davutoğlu, the author sets to reveal the patterns of contemporary Anti-Westernism. As demonstrated in the article, Davutoğlu and Dugin strongly oppose Western hegemony and support a multipolar world order in which non-Western states and civilizations will be represented. The Anti-Western ideologies developed by them not only oppose the hegemony of the West, but also reject the values, principles and paradigm of the West. At the same time, while Dugin criticizes the values of liberalism and globalization and considers the US the antithesis of Eurasia, Davutoğlu, in contrast, opposes such European values as modernity, secularism, the Enlightenment, and also criticizes Western epistemology and philosophy.

   This article attempts to trace the «archaeology» of the discourse on «genocide in Srebrenica» and to assess the significance of the memory of Srebrenica in the «biography» of Republika Srpska (and Serbia). The «Western» vision of the Srebrenica events deals with the definition of «genocide», which was finalized in the verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as an estimate of the number of victims of the war crime – 8,000 people. The discourse on the «genocide in Srebrenica» also became a political lever for the European Union to embrace the countries of the Western Balkans. Despite this, the «Western» view of the Srebrenica tragedy is now actively and purposefully denied in Republika Srpska (and Serbia). We conclude that Banja Luka (and Belgrade) have pursued a policy of presenting Srebrenica as an «anti-memory space»: the counternarrative (challenging the «Western» perspective) has become a full-fledged object of securitization, and the idea of «genocide denial» has become an object of ontological security for Republika Srpska and Serbia. The article provides reasons explaining the transition to this type of «memory politics» and concludes about the scale of conflict lurking in a possible «mnemonic security dilemma» around the discourse on Srebrenica. Through the efforts of the elites of Republika Srpska and Serbia (and personally M. Dodik), the events of 1995 in Srebrenica were incorporated into the narrative of Serb «victimhood»: the memory of war crimes committed by Serbs is replaced by the articulation of episodes related to war crimes committed against Serbs. At the same time, the narrative of Srebrenica is also articulated as a political lever for Banja Luka to achieve a greater degree of independence from Sarajevo.

   Harold F. Gosnell (1896–1997), a prominent American political scientist and one of the leaders of the first generation of the Chicago school of political studies, examines the key issues of American social cohesion during a wartime crisis in his article. The article was the scholar's reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the US entry into World War II. Taking into account the basic ideas of symbolic interactionism, Gosnell classifies as symbols of national solidarity the verbal and nonverbal representations that form citizens' sense of loyalty to their state. Gosnell frames his analysis around US President F. D. Roosevelt's «four freedoms» – freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear. The author focuses on «problematic» from the point of view of loyalty to the nation state racial and ethnic groups – African Americans, immigrants from countries with which the United States was at war. Gosnell shows that a significant component of military and political success is the government’s ability to explain to particular groups what a victory or defeat would mean to them.

   Book Review: Jervis R. Perception and misperception in international politics / R. Jervis; per. from English. T. Hovhannisyan. – M.: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2022. – 256 p.