The emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus caused the COVID-19 pandemic, which has become a global problem since the spring of 2020. Scientists have set a goal to determine the factors affecting its spread and mortality. Most of the works were devoted to the study of demographic, social and economic determinants. Little attention was paid to political factors. An analysis of the scientific literature shows that there is a theory of «effective autocracy» in the academic environment. The purpose of this article is to assess the effectiveness of political regimes (democracies and autocracies) in the fight against the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. To test the thesis of «effective autocracy», we collected data on 96 countries and built two regression models. As a result of the study, we came to the conclusion that the mortality rate from coronavirus is lower in autocracies than in democracies, which confirms the theory. Statistical calculations show that with an increase of 1 point in autocracies, mortality decreases by 0,28 people (per 1000 population). The article emphasizes that this is typical for the initial stage of the COVID-19 pandemic. Calculations based on more recent data suggest that the mortality rate from coronavirus is lower in more democratic states in the medium term: with an increase in the number of democratic states by 1 point, mortality falls by 0,06 people (per 1000 population). The author notes that this is due to both a more developed health care system in more democratic countries and a purposeful policy of autocracies to underestimate statistical data on mortality from SARS-CoV-2. The author emphasizes that the type of political regime matters only in one third of cases.

Although COVID-19 pandemic is far from its ending, and it is too early to draw even tentative conclusions regarding its effects, judging by excessive mortality of Russian citizens, one may argue that Russia responded to pandemic much worse than most of developed countries - by the end of 2021, the number of victims exceeded 1 million persons. This outcome resulted from numerous factors, including insufficient funding of public health and ineffectiveness of health policy in Russia during the entire post-Soviet period. However, pernicious effects of bad governance - a politico-economic order, which is aimed at rent-seeking as the major goal of governing Russia - played a major role in devastating outcomes of pandemic. Bad governance contributed to a poor quality of governance in Russia, according to evaluations of several international agencies. It emerged and consolidated in Russia in the early twenty-first century due to many actions of political leadership. Against this background, the pandemic became an exogenous shock, which aggravated numerous previous vices of bad governance in Russia. The article is focused on the impact of mechanisms of governing the Russian state, their incentives for various actors, and effects of political and policy decisions of Russian authorities from the viewpoint of consequences of pandemic for Russia and its citizens.

The article reveals the strategies of the political elites in a number of East European countries, which allowed them during the pandemic crisis not only to maintain stability, but also to expand the use of authoritarian practices by easing foreign policy pressure from Brussels. Using the case of Hungary as a basis for empirical analysis, I show how the crisis has increased the opportunity for power elites to consolidate their dominance. The restrictive measures imposed by Western countries were used by the Hungarian authorities as an excuse to carry out another attack against political competition and civil liberties. However, the main outcome of the political development during the pandemic crisis in Hungary was not so much a clearly observed undermining of democracy and the rule of law, as another round of nationalization of a number of economic enterprises that fell under the control of the ruling elites. This strengthened the economic foundation of autocracy in contemporary Hungary, making the regime more autonomous from EU pressure. I argue that the autocratization of Hungary in the context of the pandemic is based on the successful application of the maneuvering strategy by the elites. Their choice, in turn, is shaped by the historical legacy of Hungary, which pioneered this strategy to resist Moscow's pressure during the Communist rule. I show that the two most important factors - temporality and spatiality -are key to the effectiveness of the political survival of the current political regime in Hungary. The first of them provided an arsenal of strategies that were effectively used in the Soviet period and reapplied by the Hungarian elite nowadays. The second factor ensures the exchange of ideas between the leaders of the East European countries - EU member states. Thus, the “learning” and successful application of strategies that reinforce authoritarian tendencies in contemporary Hungary has both historical (temporal) and spatial dimensions.

The article is devoted to the problems of coordination in the European Union during the COVID-19 crisis. We show that in the first phase of the pandemic, the national governments of the EU member states played a central role in responding to the crisis. Under conditions of weak integration of health policy, this has led to a large asymmetry in the reactions of member countries and a “backtrack” in the level of coordination. However, at the second stage, the European Union, having shown a high level of resistance to stress, has demonstrated the ability to activate existing and create new platforms for coordinating the policies of member countries. In addition, citizens of the EU countries also showed a demand in increasing the level of coordination in the EU.

In the article we used the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to investigate the results of 43 electoral campaigns in different countries of the World, held in the context of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020. As far as socioeconomic indicators worsened almost everywhere, we aimed to identify the mechanism of the retrospective economic voting as creating potentially critical risks for the ruling parties. Since, in practice, countries have roughly halved in terms of the increase or decrease in electoral support for incumbents, the authors examined the effect of factors associated with the degree of deterioration of the socio-economic situation, state restrictive measures and the development of the pandemic itself, also taking into account the features of the political regime. Nine scenarios were identified, representing various combinations of conditions, leading in six cases to an increase in support for the incumbent, and in three cases to its decrease. The study showed that the classic retrospective voting in terms of punishing incumbent for a downturn in the economy is more often manifested in democratic regimes. It is also noteworthy that socio-economic factors, which are the consequences of a pandemic, appear to be more significant to the electorate than factors directly related to the health issues. In particular, a relatively low level of GDP decline is always present in scenarios of support growth for an incumbent, and a significant increase in unemployment is always present in all scenarios of a decrease in its rating. A feature of authoritarian regimes is that voters are more inclined to support the ruling parties with mild restrictive measures, while in democracies people are ready to vote for incumbents even in the case of tough, but in some way effective restrictions. In general, restrictive measures (like their absence) always affect elections, but their effect depends on other conditions. In consideration of the natural limitations in the form of a sample of countries, the peculiarities of the method used and the further development of the pandemic, it seems important to continue such studies in order to clarify the conclusions and perspectives.

How the COVID-19 pandemic affected the attitudes of Russians towards political institutions? The aggregate data of public opinion polls suggest that, according to various available indicators, the level of political support in Russia has slightly dropped, compared to the pre-pandemic period. Yet, this kind of data does not allow one to infer what aspects of the pandemic experience are the most important predictors of individual assessments of the government's performance. The article presents the results of the analysis of the data from the first two Russian waves of the international online panel survey ‘Values in Crisis’ (ViC). The first wave was carried out in Jun 2020; the second - in April-May 2021. The sample size was 1,527 and 1,199 respectively; 1,014 respondents participated in both waves. The main dependent variable is an integral index of political support that includes indicators of both diffuse and specific support. Regression modeling demonstrates that during the first wave of the pandemic in Russia (spring 2020) the direct experience of the disease and COVID-related anxiety were positively correlated with political support, while anxiety over economic losses showed negative correlation. A decrease in economic well-being had no effect on political support. Other significant predictors included right-wing political views and trust in traditional media (leading to an increase in support) and propensity to share COVID-skepticism (leading to a decrease in support). One year later, in the first half of 2021, the situation has somewhat changed: neither experiencing COVID, nor COVID-related anxiety were no longer associated with support, while the effect of economic factors became more prominent.

In this paper, I explore how Russians attribute the responsibility for handling the economic crisis among multiple political institutions. Previous research established the link between the crisis and electoral results for the ruling party and other regime players, but did not address the question of the responsibility burden's distribution between branches and levels of public authorities in Russia. Using the results of representative survey and a novel instrument - comparative responsibility attribution index, which allows to assess the intensity of responsibility and the ordering of the institutions simultaneously - I demonstrate that Russians singles out the president as a chief responsibly for handling the crisis. Moreover, there exists a tight consensus about his role and place among other institutions. The federal government, the Sate Duma, and the governors follow his lead with the ruling party and mayors judged as the least responsible. Using spectral decomposition, I also show that Russian voters when it comes to getting out of the crisis also distinguish between the federal and subnational authorities. Finally, the individual-level analysis reveals that gender, age, political preferences, and crisis impact, but its significance caries across target institutions. The study contributes to the growing scholarship on responsibility attribution under autocracies and the ways the voters navigate the institutional complexities of modern polities.

In April 2020, the federal authorities in Russia decided to transfer additional decision-making powers to the regions, regarding pandemic-related non-pharmaceutical interventions. While some experts view this as a step towards more federalism, most researchers consider it an attempt to shift the responsibility and blame for decisions and their consequences onto the governors. The empowerment of the regions led to increased attention towards their heads on the social media, as a mirror of the public opinion. This study attempts to find out, to what extent the decision to decentralize governance during the pandemic affected the attitude towards the heads of the regions on the social media, whether this influence was positive or negative, and if the effectiveness of governance and the governors' usage of the social media could have mediated this influence. The analysis conducted using the regression analysis on the data obtained for April - November 2020 for 80 regions. The main finding of the paper is that the approval and disapproval of the governors depended on the stringency of adopted federal and regional measures, which reduced the share of positive comments and increased the share of negative once. At the same time, the effectiveness of governance appeared to be a significant factor: both political control and social policy had a significant effect on the image of governors within the period under study. On the contrary, the use of the social media by governors does not seem to be important, which speaks for the insufficient utilization of this instrument by the regional authorities. The study contributes to the analysis of the COVID-19 policies and their consequences, as well as to the research on the role of governance and the Internet in the Russian political dynamics.

A conservative turn in Russian politics has made the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) a key beneficiary of the new policy. Within the framework of Peter Berger's theory of desecularization, the ROC increased its influence through an alliance with the Kremlin. This made it possible to move smoothly from the model of «selective cooperation» to the model of «state religion», according to the classification of state-church relations proposed by Kristina Stoeckl. By early 2020, the ROC was perhaps at the height of its political influence. However, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to have paused the strong alliance of the Kremlin and the ROC. When the government announced lockdown measures and demanded that all churches cease services with the public, not all priests agreed to comply. The church-state crisis manifested in two divisions: between the Church and the state, between loyalists and fundamentalists within the ROC. We argue that although these cleavages posed a threat to the Patriarchate’s stability and power, the church leaders managed to maintain the loyalty of most believers. The authors show that the ROC proved its political loyalty to the Kremlin. Using individual-level data from the Values in Crisis project, the effect of religiosity on the support of government public health measures is explored. The findings reveal that higher religiosity is associated with higher levels of political loyalty. However, the COVID-19 crisis illustrates that the illusion of an equal partnership between the state and the church vanished.

Between 2007 and 2012, the Russian armed forces went through unprecedented changes that affected all elements of the military organization. Despite political and financial support from the president and prime minister, the reformers could not meet all reform goals, and some changes were slowed down or backpaddled. The research uses data from 18 expert interviews, online media materials and employs the advocacy coalition framework to show that the Ministry of Defense has been unable to implement some changes because of the opposition within the military and presidential coalitions of civil-military relations. Interagency resistance forced the Ministry of Defense to abandon some of the changes. Some others were canceled after Minister Serdyukov’s ouster. This article demonstrates the strategies that the reformers used to pursue their goals and overcome the resistance from the reform opponents. The resistance eventually led to the defence minister's resignation, which halted further radical changes in the Russian armed forces. The results show that even the full political support from an authoritarian leader cannot save politicians and their programs from the influence of other actors. Dissatisfaction with the changes split the presidential coalition. It also damaged the interagency interaction, which ultimately weakened the managerial position of the reformer. Moreover, this case study showed that in civil-military relations, the conformity of the reformer’s behavior with the dominant military beliefs plays a major role alongside the factual component of reform.

For many years, right-wing populism was considered irrelevant in Spain. The recent success of the Vox party, first at the regional and then at the national level, is clear evidence that the transformation of the Spanish party system continues. Moreover, right-wing and left-wing populism (represented respectively by the Vox and Podemos parties) coexist today in the context of its increasing fragmentation. The article attempts to answer the question why two types of populist parties emerged in Spain, what are the key differences between them and what place they occupy in the country's party system. The research intention involves identifying the main characteristics of right and left populism based on the analysis of the latest scientific literature and the subsequent assessment of the prospects of the Vox and Podemos parties. The factors of their electoral successes are determined; it is assumed that the territorial factor plays a special role in the differentiation of Spanish populism. The study uses the methods of comparative analysis and social constructivism, and populism itself is considered within the framework of an ideational approach. Based on the results of the study, the characteristics of left and right populism in Spain were determined on the example of the Vox and Podemos parties. It was concluded that the case of Spain is of particular interest in the European context, as it allows one to study the electoral successes and prospects of both left and right populists. The role of the territorial factor in delimiting left and right populism was emphasized.

The article presents the main results of the IX All-Russian Congress of Political Scientists, held in Moscow on December 16-18, 2021 under the auspices of the Russian Political Science Association, timed to coincide with the completion of the 65 th anniversary year since the founding of the RPSA. The largest political science event in Russia was held in a mixed (face-to-face and online) format, which made it possible to neutralize the negative consequences in the context of pandemic restrictions and ensure the scale of representation and the quality of the discussion platforms. An analysis of the course and results of the Congress demonstrated the growing role of political science in the process of forming a new political order in the modern world, including the characteristics of political regimes, governance principles, technologies and mechanisms, as well as the quality of public policy actors, means and methods for solving political problems, and the internal structure of political interactions. The article considers the possibilities of political science to shape the political world, responding to its problems and challenges.

On December 18, 2021, the most significant scientific event, the VI All-Russian Forum of Young Political Scientists, was held at the Financial University with the support of the Russian Political Science Association. This event is of great importance for the youth political science community and is an opportunity not only to gain experience in public speaking and new knowledge, but also to find like-minded people, including from other universities and regions. As the main goal of the Forum, the organizers identified the search for the identity of young political scientists, the desire to help in choosing a professional future and the topics of future scientific research. The most popular areas of political science among young political scientists are international relations, memory politics, the relationship between the digital environment and politics, ethnopolitology, politics at the local level. The most popular areas of political science within the framework of young political scientists have become international relations, memory politics, the relationship between the digital environment and politics, ethnopolitology, local politics. These areas attracted the most attention among the speakers. As a result, the Forum of Young Political Scientists allows strengthening the community of young researchers and personal potential.